Wednesday, January 26, 2011
Dental stiches and mikveh - Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 2:87
With regard to whether or not stitches as a result of oral surgery present a problem of chatzitza for a woman who has to go to the mikveh, Rav Moshe rules that since the stitches cannot be seen and can only be manipulated via a fine instrument they are considered to be in a מקום בלוע and thus do not need to have the water reach them and thus are not considered to be a chatzitza.
Listening to Gentile music - Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 2:56
In this brief teshuva, Rav Moshe rules that it is forbidden to listen to non-Jewish religious music, even on the radio or a recording. This applies not only to current songs, but to ones from the past as well [ed. note - this can be an issue when taking music courses in college and Gregorian chants are part of the curriculum]. Even if the song uses psukim from Tehillim (or elsewhere in Tanach, e.g. The Hallelujah Chorus), it is forbidden. However, if the song is written and/or song by a non-Jew but has no religious purpose, then there is technically no prohibition.
Rav Moshe considers the case of Acheir, who the Gemara claims left Jewish religious life as a result of his constantly singing Greek songs. After some discussion as to whether this could really be the reason that he abandoned his religious life, Rav Moshe cites the Maharsha who says that he was singing songs that had connections to idolatry that led him to heresy. Rav Moshe also notes that a potential issue is the mentioning of the names of other gods, as that would violate the prohibition of ושם אלהים אחרים...לא ישמע על פיך.
[ed. - Does that last point present a problem from songs such as "Let it Be" or "Walking in Memphis"? Discuss.]
Rav Moshe considers the case of Acheir, who the Gemara claims left Jewish religious life as a result of his constantly singing Greek songs. After some discussion as to whether this could really be the reason that he abandoned his religious life, Rav Moshe cites the Maharsha who says that he was singing songs that had connections to idolatry that led him to heresy. Rav Moshe also notes that a potential issue is the mentioning of the names of other gods, as that would violate the prohibition of ושם אלהים אחרים...לא ישמע על פיך.
[ed. - Does that last point present a problem from songs such as "Let it Be" or "Walking in Memphis"? Discuss.]
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
Hunting for sport - Noda BiYehuda Yoreh Deah 2:10
The Noda BiYehuda was famously asked if it is permissible for a Jew to hunt animals for sport. He begins by considering two obvious objections, and rejects them both.
First, he discusses whether hunting would fall under the category of צער בעלי חיים, causing unnecessary pain to the animal. He rejects this objection on two grounds: (1) This rule only applies when there is no benefit for humans, but since when one hunts he stands to get some benefit (perhaps the skins), then there is no consideration of צער בעלי חיים, and (2) this principle only applies when the goal is to apply pain. However, since when one hunts he aims to kill the animal quickly, and to actually put it out of pain, then there is no issue.
The second likely objection is that of בל תשחית, loosely defined as wasting some part of this world. Again, the Noda BiYehuda rejects this problem, as the hunter does stand to gain something once he shoots the animal, and thus there is no wasting involved.
However, the Noda BiYehuda still rejects the permissibility of hunting. He begins the second part of his teshuva by noting that hunting is something that is associated in Tanach with Nimrod and Esav, and thus is not something connected to the character of the descendants of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov. As to the defense that one should hunt in order to get the skins of the animals, the Noda BiYehuda points out that plenty of animals die on their own and thus there is a readily available supply of such skins without resorting to hunting.
As to the defense that the mishna in Sanhedrin 2a allows for the killing of wild and potentially dangerous animals, the Noda BiYehuda notes that this likely only applies once they have attacked someone and have shown themselves to be actually dangerous, if it applies at all. If anything, hunting for sport is merely revelatory of a cruel nature.
Furthermore, he points out that there may be a specific prohibition involved, namely a violation of ונשמרתם מאד לנפשותיכם - that we are enjoined to take care of ourselves physically. Once who willingly enters a wooded area or some other spot where he is expecting there to be wild and vicious animals is taking his life into his hands (even if he is a relatively good shot), and thus would be violating this mitzva. Even further, the Noda BiYehuda notes that the mishna in the 4th perek of Brachot provides a special prayer that one should recite when entering into a dangerous place, and he reasons that going hunting qualifies as such (based on the fact that even the great hunter Esav said הנה אנכי הולך למות - and the simple explanation is that he expected to eventually die in a hunting accident).
First, he discusses whether hunting would fall under the category of צער בעלי חיים, causing unnecessary pain to the animal. He rejects this objection on two grounds: (1) This rule only applies when there is no benefit for humans, but since when one hunts he stands to get some benefit (perhaps the skins), then there is no consideration of צער בעלי חיים, and (2) this principle only applies when the goal is to apply pain. However, since when one hunts he aims to kill the animal quickly, and to actually put it out of pain, then there is no issue.
The second likely objection is that of בל תשחית, loosely defined as wasting some part of this world. Again, the Noda BiYehuda rejects this problem, as the hunter does stand to gain something once he shoots the animal, and thus there is no wasting involved.
However, the Noda BiYehuda still rejects the permissibility of hunting. He begins the second part of his teshuva by noting that hunting is something that is associated in Tanach with Nimrod and Esav, and thus is not something connected to the character of the descendants of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov. As to the defense that one should hunt in order to get the skins of the animals, the Noda BiYehuda points out that plenty of animals die on their own and thus there is a readily available supply of such skins without resorting to hunting.
As to the defense that the mishna in Sanhedrin 2a allows for the killing of wild and potentially dangerous animals, the Noda BiYehuda notes that this likely only applies once they have attacked someone and have shown themselves to be actually dangerous, if it applies at all. If anything, hunting for sport is merely revelatory of a cruel nature.
Furthermore, he points out that there may be a specific prohibition involved, namely a violation of ונשמרתם מאד לנפשותיכם - that we are enjoined to take care of ourselves physically. Once who willingly enters a wooded area or some other spot where he is expecting there to be wild and vicious animals is taking his life into his hands (even if he is a relatively good shot), and thus would be violating this mitzva. Even further, the Noda BiYehuda notes that the mishna in the 4th perek of Brachot provides a special prayer that one should recite when entering into a dangerous place, and he reasons that going hunting qualifies as such (based on the fact that even the great hunter Esav said הנה אנכי הולך למות - and the simple explanation is that he expected to eventually die in a hunting accident).
Tuesday, January 4, 2011
Getting remarried - how soon is too soon? - Igrot Moshe Even HaEzer 4:48-51
In this run of teshuvot from a variety of years spanning several decades, Rav Moshe Feinstein deals with issues pertaining to how soon a woman can get remarried. The issues are generally those surrounding children, both those unborn as well as those recently born.
In general, the rule is that a woman has to wait for three months after the end of her previous marriage before entering a new one so that if she becomes pregnant it will be clear who the father is. In this case, asked by Rabbi Ephraim Greenblatt of Memphis, TN, the woman had been separated from her husband for several years yet only now became officially divorced. Rav Moshe ruled that she nevertheless had to wait three months from the time of the actual divorce.
In the second teshuva, Rav Moshe's grandson-in-law Rabbi Shabtai Rappaport asked about a woman whose husband was killed in war (presumably in the Lebanon War, as the question was asked in late 1983). The woman had an infant from that husband (born after his death) and had stopped nursing the child for normal reasons. The woman now met a man and wanted to marry him. Despite the fact that in halacha 24 months are allotted for nursing, with the fear that if a woman becomes pregnant before that she will starve the baby, the fact is that since the baby had stopped nursing on its own (well before 24 months) and since the presence of a husband would provide a stable household for this woman and her children, Rav Moshe permitted her to get married without having to wait until the end of 24 months.
Rav Moshe takes a different approach when it comes to a divorcee. In a case posed to him by Rav Moshe Dovid Tendler, the woman was divorced with an infant, and wanted to remarry before the child turned 2 years old. Since the husband in this case was particularly difficult with regard to paying alimony, and the courts were fairly ineffective in forcing him to do so, Rav Moshe found it difficult to consider this child as being supported by his father (the presumption is that the new husband will not want to support the children of the old one - obviously that can vary from case to case). Rav Moshe ultimately permits her to remarry once the child is 18 months provided that she sees to it that the child is financially provided for and provided that she feels an overwhelming need to get married at that point in time.
In a teshuva written one year later to Rav Shalom Tendler, Rav Moshe addressed a case of a divorcee who had a very young infant and had stopped nursing already so that she could return to work (not far remarriage purposes) and now had met someone interested in marrying her. Rav Moshe permitted her to marry the man, provided that she saw to it that the child would be fully provided for until age 2. The fact that the man was considered to be a positive development for the child played a role in this decision as well.
In general, the rule is that a woman has to wait for three months after the end of her previous marriage before entering a new one so that if she becomes pregnant it will be clear who the father is. In this case, asked by Rabbi Ephraim Greenblatt of Memphis, TN, the woman had been separated from her husband for several years yet only now became officially divorced. Rav Moshe ruled that she nevertheless had to wait three months from the time of the actual divorce.
In the second teshuva, Rav Moshe's grandson-in-law Rabbi Shabtai Rappaport asked about a woman whose husband was killed in war (presumably in the Lebanon War, as the question was asked in late 1983). The woman had an infant from that husband (born after his death) and had stopped nursing the child for normal reasons. The woman now met a man and wanted to marry him. Despite the fact that in halacha 24 months are allotted for nursing, with the fear that if a woman becomes pregnant before that she will starve the baby, the fact is that since the baby had stopped nursing on its own (well before 24 months) and since the presence of a husband would provide a stable household for this woman and her children, Rav Moshe permitted her to get married without having to wait until the end of 24 months.
Rav Moshe takes a different approach when it comes to a divorcee. In a case posed to him by Rav Moshe Dovid Tendler, the woman was divorced with an infant, and wanted to remarry before the child turned 2 years old. Since the husband in this case was particularly difficult with regard to paying alimony, and the courts were fairly ineffective in forcing him to do so, Rav Moshe found it difficult to consider this child as being supported by his father (the presumption is that the new husband will not want to support the children of the old one - obviously that can vary from case to case). Rav Moshe ultimately permits her to remarry once the child is 18 months provided that she sees to it that the child is financially provided for and provided that she feels an overwhelming need to get married at that point in time.
In a teshuva written one year later to Rav Shalom Tendler, Rav Moshe addressed a case of a divorcee who had a very young infant and had stopped nursing already so that she could return to work (not far remarriage purposes) and now had met someone interested in marrying her. Rav Moshe permitted her to marry the man, provided that she saw to it that the child would be fully provided for until age 2. The fact that the man was considered to be a positive development for the child played a role in this decision as well.
Monday, December 27, 2010
More on Artificial Insemination (l'chumra) - Rav Yaakov Epstein - Techumin 24
In this article published right after that of Rabbi Ralbag, Rav Yaakov Epstein comes out against the lenient ruling regarding children born to single women who have been artificially inseminated.
Rav Epstein approaches this issue mainly through the perspective of the issue of שתוקי, and he main conclusion from his analysis of this issue is that a שתוקי is generally dealt with strictly, and is considered to be at best a ספק ממזר, and that a child whose father is not known due to AI almost definitely falls into this category.
With regard to the notion that a woman who goes to a hospital to be artificially inseminated is dealt with as if the case is one of כל דפריש מרובא פריש, Rav Epstein raises a doubt as to whether this is really the case. He notes that in order to invoke פריש we rely on the idea that the semen is no longer connected to its donor. However, since the woman does come to an established location (the hospital), there may be room to say that she is really entering into a case of כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה דמי. Even if this is not a true case of קבוע, and even if it thus falls into the פריש realm, since we are dealing with a case of ספק ממזר we are going to be strict.
Another line of leniency would be to allow the doctor to testify that the donor is someone who would not render the child a ממזר. However, Rav Epstein notes that this is nearly impossible for a number of reasons. First, sperm banks rely on the anonymity of the donors, and thus the doctors are unlikely to be able to make such a statement (and they would need to know not only the identity of the donor, but also be able to confirm that the semen implanted in the woman definitely came from that donor and that the woman had not received any other semen). Furthermore, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach ruled in such a case that there are at least two problems that would remain - the suspicion of זנות on the part of the woman [ed. - would this change if such procedures become more common?] and the fact that since the semen is obtained via הוצאת זרע לבטלה that this would somehow convey a bad influence on the child that would be born as a result. Finally, Rav Epstein notes that given the various halachic implications of fatherhood, there is a necessity for a fairly high level of נאמנות in establishing paternity, and such a level is virtually impossible in this case.
Finally, Rav Epstein notes the position of Rav Moshe Feinstein which claims that the status of ממזר can only be conferred via intercourse and not through AI. He rejects this position, noting that most other poskim do not follow this view.
Rav Epstein approaches this issue mainly through the perspective of the issue of שתוקי, and he main conclusion from his analysis of this issue is that a שתוקי is generally dealt with strictly, and is considered to be at best a ספק ממזר, and that a child whose father is not known due to AI almost definitely falls into this category.
With regard to the notion that a woman who goes to a hospital to be artificially inseminated is dealt with as if the case is one of כל דפריש מרובא פריש, Rav Epstein raises a doubt as to whether this is really the case. He notes that in order to invoke פריש we rely on the idea that the semen is no longer connected to its donor. However, since the woman does come to an established location (the hospital), there may be room to say that she is really entering into a case of כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה דמי. Even if this is not a true case of קבוע, and even if it thus falls into the פריש realm, since we are dealing with a case of ספק ממזר we are going to be strict.
Another line of leniency would be to allow the doctor to testify that the donor is someone who would not render the child a ממזר. However, Rav Epstein notes that this is nearly impossible for a number of reasons. First, sperm banks rely on the anonymity of the donors, and thus the doctors are unlikely to be able to make such a statement (and they would need to know not only the identity of the donor, but also be able to confirm that the semen implanted in the woman definitely came from that donor and that the woman had not received any other semen). Furthermore, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach ruled in such a case that there are at least two problems that would remain - the suspicion of זנות on the part of the woman [ed. - would this change if such procedures become more common?] and the fact that since the semen is obtained via הוצאת זרע לבטלה that this would somehow convey a bad influence on the child that would be born as a result. Finally, Rav Epstein notes that given the various halachic implications of fatherhood, there is a necessity for a fairly high level of נאמנות in establishing paternity, and such a level is virtually impossible in this case.
Finally, Rav Epstein notes the position of Rav Moshe Feinstein which claims that the status of ממזר can only be conferred via intercourse and not through AI. He rejects this position, noting that most other poskim do not follow this view.
Sunday, December 26, 2010
Artificial Insemination - Rav Mordechai Ralbag - Techumin 24
In this article in Techumin volume 24, Rav Mordechai Ralbag (a חבר בית דין in Yerushalayim) discusses the issue of a single woman who is artificially inseminated (AI) and the status of the child. At the outset, he notes that he is not endorsing the practice, but rather is discussing what happens with the child assuming that a woman has proceeded with said procedure.
Rabbi Ralbag begins by assuming that the most common case of AI is with a married couple who is having fertility issues. He notes that although there is some discussion on the issue, most poskim allow the husband to make his semen available for such a procedure, without worrying about השחתת זרע לבטלה, as there is a clear purpose in this case. However, everyone agrees that so long as the woman is married there is no permission given for another man to donate his semen. There are various reasons given for this prohibition - ranging from an איסור דאורייתא to a range of concerns that will develop down the road to a visceral distaste - but the agreement on the basic law stands.
In terms of the status of the child in such a case, if the donor is not Jewish then the child is fine, as the law is that a non-Jewish man who impregnates a Jewish woman produces a child whose halachic status is clear. If the donor is a Jew, then there is a debate as to whether or not the child has the status of a ממזר.
When it comes to the case of a sperm bank, how are we to deal with the identification of the donor, assuming that the bank keeps such information private? Outside of Israel, we can assume that most donors are not Jewish, and thus certainly for a single girl there will be no problem, since Rav Moshe Feinstein and Rav Yaakov Breisch have already established that we can follow the majority. If the woman is married, then things are more complicated, since what happens if the donor was in fact a Jew? Rabbi Ralbag invokes the rules of כל דפריש מרובא פריש - that since the woman goes to the hospital to be impregnated, then the sperm is considered to be separated from its source, it which case we can assume that it was derived from the majority, which in the case of חוץ לארץ means that it came from a non-Jew.
Based on an argument about the difference between שתוקי and אסופי, Rabbi Ralbag posits three possible views for our case, where the identity of the mother is known but that of the father is not:
1) According to the Maharit, the child is considered a שתוקי since even the mother does not know the identity of the father, and thus the child is a ספק ממזר.
2) According to the Noda BiYehuda, the child is considered to be an אסופי who has a sign on him (namely that his mother is protecting him). Thus, there is no ספק on the mother, and the ספק on the child is lifted by the fact that the child is considered to be פריש and thus is כשר.
3) According to the Yeshuot Yaakov and the Beit Meir, it is possible that there is no problem at all, since, based on a Gemara in Sotah, we learn that זנות is only an issue when there is actual intercourse, which did not take place in the case of AI. As such, it could be that the child is complete כשר. On the other hand, it is possible that since we know that the single mother became pregnant without know who the father is that the child will be deemed a שתוקי.
Rabbi Ralbag brings his analysis to an end by citing the view of Rav Moshe Feinstein (cited earlier on this blog) that ממזרות can only be contracted via an actual act of intercourse, and since there is none in this case, the child will be fine even if the father is himself a ממזר.
In his conclusion, Rabbi Ralbag brings support from both Rav Shalom Messas (Rav of Yerushalayim) and Rav Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg, that his analysis is correct and that if a single woman does receive AI, even though it is not advised at the outset, nevertheless the child will be deemed כשר and acceptable to marry another Jew without question.
Rabbi Ralbag begins by assuming that the most common case of AI is with a married couple who is having fertility issues. He notes that although there is some discussion on the issue, most poskim allow the husband to make his semen available for such a procedure, without worrying about השחתת זרע לבטלה, as there is a clear purpose in this case. However, everyone agrees that so long as the woman is married there is no permission given for another man to donate his semen. There are various reasons given for this prohibition - ranging from an איסור דאורייתא to a range of concerns that will develop down the road to a visceral distaste - but the agreement on the basic law stands.
In terms of the status of the child in such a case, if the donor is not Jewish then the child is fine, as the law is that a non-Jewish man who impregnates a Jewish woman produces a child whose halachic status is clear. If the donor is a Jew, then there is a debate as to whether or not the child has the status of a ממזר.
When it comes to the case of a sperm bank, how are we to deal with the identification of the donor, assuming that the bank keeps such information private? Outside of Israel, we can assume that most donors are not Jewish, and thus certainly for a single girl there will be no problem, since Rav Moshe Feinstein and Rav Yaakov Breisch have already established that we can follow the majority. If the woman is married, then things are more complicated, since what happens if the donor was in fact a Jew? Rabbi Ralbag invokes the rules of כל דפריש מרובא פריש - that since the woman goes to the hospital to be impregnated, then the sperm is considered to be separated from its source, it which case we can assume that it was derived from the majority, which in the case of חוץ לארץ means that it came from a non-Jew.
Based on an argument about the difference between שתוקי and אסופי, Rabbi Ralbag posits three possible views for our case, where the identity of the mother is known but that of the father is not:
1) According to the Maharit, the child is considered a שתוקי since even the mother does not know the identity of the father, and thus the child is a ספק ממזר.
2) According to the Noda BiYehuda, the child is considered to be an אסופי who has a sign on him (namely that his mother is protecting him). Thus, there is no ספק on the mother, and the ספק on the child is lifted by the fact that the child is considered to be פריש and thus is כשר.
3) According to the Yeshuot Yaakov and the Beit Meir, it is possible that there is no problem at all, since, based on a Gemara in Sotah, we learn that זנות is only an issue when there is actual intercourse, which did not take place in the case of AI. As such, it could be that the child is complete כשר. On the other hand, it is possible that since we know that the single mother became pregnant without know who the father is that the child will be deemed a שתוקי.
Rabbi Ralbag brings his analysis to an end by citing the view of Rav Moshe Feinstein (cited earlier on this blog) that ממזרות can only be contracted via an actual act of intercourse, and since there is none in this case, the child will be fine even if the father is himself a ממזר.
In his conclusion, Rabbi Ralbag brings support from both Rav Shalom Messas (Rav of Yerushalayim) and Rav Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg, that his analysis is correct and that if a single woman does receive AI, even though it is not advised at the outset, nevertheless the child will be deemed כשר and acceptable to marry another Jew without question.
Wednesday, December 22, 2010
Maintaining a Minyan - Igrot Moshe Orach Chayim 3:16
In memory of my grandfather, Walter Rosenthal a"h, whose 9th yahrtzeit is this evening, the 16th of Tevet. He was described by his Rabbi at his funeral as a "shul Jew," always committed to ensuring that he did everything that he could for his out-of-town congregation.
Rav Moshe Feinstein was asked about a shul that was having trouble with its weekday minyan. Apparently, the time of the minyan was too early for some of the people who belonged to the shul, and they wanted to daven elsewhere. However, this put the daily minyan in jeopardy and thus the question was whether the minyan should be abandoned or whether people should be pushed to help make the minyan.
Rav Moshe ruled that since this shul had a permanent minyan, it was incumbent upon the members of the community to keep it going. Even if some of the people chose to daven instead in a nearby Beit Midrash, which may be a preferable location for davening (although perhaps only for people who spend their day learning there), there should at least be enough people who make sure that the shul in question is able to maintain their daily minyan, insofar as it was well-established and constant. However, Rav Moshe notes that the Beit Midrash should be assured of a minyan as well, and if the davening time of the shul is too early for people, then a rotation should be set up so that no one has to overextend themselves every day.
Rav Moshe Feinstein was asked about a shul that was having trouble with its weekday minyan. Apparently, the time of the minyan was too early for some of the people who belonged to the shul, and they wanted to daven elsewhere. However, this put the daily minyan in jeopardy and thus the question was whether the minyan should be abandoned or whether people should be pushed to help make the minyan.
Rav Moshe ruled that since this shul had a permanent minyan, it was incumbent upon the members of the community to keep it going. Even if some of the people chose to daven instead in a nearby Beit Midrash, which may be a preferable location for davening (although perhaps only for people who spend their day learning there), there should at least be enough people who make sure that the shul in question is able to maintain their daily minyan, insofar as it was well-established and constant. However, Rav Moshe notes that the Beit Midrash should be assured of a minyan as well, and if the davening time of the shul is too early for people, then a rotation should be set up so that no one has to overextend themselves every day.
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