Skipping parts of davening - Igrot Moshe Orach Chayim 4:91

Can a teacher skip parts of davening if he is running late in the morning? In this teshuva, Rav Moshe Feinstein says that in such a case, the teacher can most definitely skip פסוקי דזמרא. He offers two rationales for this. First, if he were to come late to class he would be taking away learning time from his students; second, coming late to class would constitute stealing from his employer, who is paying him to be at work at a certain time. Rav Moshe notes that if the issue is that the teacher has his own work to do he should not skip any part of davening.

Rav Moshe does note the option of saying הביננו, which is a severely shortened version of שמונה עשרה, but concludes that since it is so rarely, if ever, said these days it is unlikely that the teacher will know it and thus the time saving as a result is likely to be minimal.

Pidyon HaBen when the father is not Jewish - Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 1:195

In 1954, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Burstein of Kansas City asked Rav Moshe Feinstein about what to do in terms of pidyon haben for a child of a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father [a pidyon is based on פטר רחם, the opening of the womb, and thus it is the mother that is the critical aprent in this regard. See Bechorot 46a for more on this]. Rabbi Burstein had recommended that the maternal grandfather perform the pidyon haben, and Rav Moshe was inclined to agree with this ruling, as the grandfather could step in via the rules of זכייה, especially since the non-Jewish father is halachically insignificant in this case. Additionally, since there was a concern that the child would not do a pidyon for himself once he grew older, it was deemed best to do the ceremony now with the grandfather in lieu of the father. Rav Moshe went so far as to side with those who felt that the grandfather could do the pidyon with a bracha, and that the child would not need to re-redeem himself once he came of age.

Rav Moshe noted that, if possible, it would be best if the money used in the pidyon could technically be given to the child for the express purpose of the pidyon, as this would allow them to fulfill the view of the Shach.

With regard to the recitation of the bracha of שהחינו, Rav Moshe felt that one could follow the view of the Chatam Sofer and recite the bracha in this case (against the position of the Tzlach).

Yichud with an adopted child - Igrot Moshe Even HaEzer 4:64.2

As a rule, there is no prohibition of yichud (seclusion) with one's own children. However, what about an adopted child? Since the parents and children are not actually related by blood, is there is problem for a father and his adopted daughter to be alone together in a house? We will review Rav Moshe Feinstein's answer today, and follow soon with the more detailed analysis of the Tzitz Eliezer.

Rav Moshe begins by describing the general situation of adoption, noting that it is a wonderful thing for a couple to do to adopt an orphan, and that often times this is done because the couple themselves have been unsuccessful in having children and adoption gives them the opportunity to raise a Jewish child. He further notes that it is important to eventually let the children know that they are adopted so that they do not have problems later in life in terms of potentially marrying their biological relatives, and, as such, it is important to try to find out who their real parents are or were (assuming the child is Jewish from birth).

In terms of the yichud issue, Rav Moshe rules that it is not a problem. His primary prooftext is a Gemara in Sotah 43 that rules that an adopted daughter (or step-daughter) should not marry her step-siblings since even though they are not blood relations, it presents the appearance of siblings marrying one another. Based on this, Rav Moshe extrapolates that if the father would be careful to not have yichud with this daughter, it would "blow their cover" and make it clear that she was not actually related. As such, it must be that no prohibition of yichud is introduced in such a case.

Rav Moshe further notes that yichud is not a problem since the parent would not dare do anything untoward with the stepchild or adopted child, insofar as he or she fears his or her spouse finding out. As such, Rav Moshe cautions that if the parent of the same gender as the child passes away, then the remaining parent should try to avoid yichud situations going forward.

Raisinets and Tape Recorders - Igrot Moshe Orach Chaim 3:31

In a brief teshuva, Rav Moshe Feinstein tackles two unrelated issues. The first is the question of what bracha to make on chocolate covered raisins, insofar as both components are independently desirable and delicious. As such, Rav Moshe rules that one should make both a שהכל and a בורא פרי העץ. Since it is generally not possible to eat the raisin part independent of the chocolate, a person should have in mind not to include the raisin when he makes the bracha on the chocolate, or should make a בורא פרי העץ on some other fruit first.

The second issue dealt with is whether there is a problem of erasing Hashem's name when one erases a tape recoding that mentions the name. Since the name of Hashem is not actually written on the tape, there is no actual prohibition, but Rav Moshe cautions that others may think that we are taking a cavalier attitude towards God's name. However, if one can erase it in a more indirect manner [perhaps by taping over it?] then that would be preferable.

Heart Transplants - Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 2:174

In this teshuva from 1968, Rav Moshe Feinstein offers an in-depth analysis of the issues involved with heart transplants. Bear in mind, as mentioned in the last teshuva, that this was written in the early days of heart transplants, when success was not assured.

Rav Moshe begins by flatly prohibiting heart transplants on the grounds that it involves the murder of two people - the donor and the recipient. The donor is deemed a murder victim since his heart was still beating when it was removed from him, and the recipient is deemed a victim since he is sure to die soon as a result of the transplant and he is condemned to a brief life of pain and suffering in the interim.

The bulk of the teshuva is divided into four sections, in which Rav Moshe makes the following main points:

1) It is forbidden to shorted someone's life by even the smallest amount, and thus so long as someone's heart is beating, removing it in order to give it to someone else constitutes killing that individual.

2) We are not experts in determining the exact time of death, and even once breathing has stopped it is still possible for someone to be alive.

3) Giving someone a heart transplant does not qualify as healing the recipient per se, but rather as prolonging his life. Since that life is likely to be one of suffering, it is forbidden to inflict such a situation on another person. [ed note - does anyone know Rav Moshe's opinion about hooking someone up to a life support machine? Wouldn't that seem to be the same thing?]

4) Rav Moshe's final point discusses the limits of the requirement of לא תעמד על דם רעך - that we are not required to actually cut off a limb in order to save another individual. Certainly in this case, where we are asking someone to give up a major organ for the purpose of possibly saving someone else for a small amount of time there is no requirement to do so.

[My hope is to continue to find teshuvot on this topic that were written as the medical science continued to advance. Stay tuned.]

Determining death - Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 2:146

[ed note - this teshuva has been in the news recently due to the recent discussions concerning the RCA's paper about brain death. I am not an expert in the issues involved, nor am I seeking to contribute to the overall discussion. However, I do feel that in any overheated debate, it is important to actually check the sources that are the source of the issue.]

In a teshuva from 1970, Rav Moshe Feinstein was asked to rule on the medical notion of brain death. He begins by stating that life is determined by breathing, and cessation of brain activity does not necessarily mean cessation of respiratory activity. As such, brain death would not be considered death [ed note - Rav Moshe's son-in-law, Rabbi Dr. Moshe Tendler, has drawn a distinction with regard to this teshuva between brain death and cerebral death - see here]. So long as the doctors are able to detect some signs of life, even if they require sensitive high-tech equipment to do so, they should treat the patient to the utmost degree in order to save him.

[Rav Moshe pauses at this point to note that we generally are not concerned with things that can only be detected via microscopes and other instruments which perceive that which we cannot perceive with our senses. The case of a patient whose heartbeat can only be detected via electric radiogram is an exception to this rule.]

The next extensive part of this teshuva deals with the various parts of the body that are discussed in sections of the Gemara that discuss determining death, such as the nose and the navel. Rav Moshe concludes that neither one is actually responsible for life, but rather are merely locations on the body where we can perceive whether or not life functions are continuing, and ultimately he leans towards the view of the Chacham Tzvi that the heart is the major determinant of life.

At the very end of the teshuva, Rav Moshe discusses the issue of heart transplants, which had been done for the first time in 1967, and was still exceedingly rare at the time of this teshuva (see here for more history). Rav Moshe feels that the removal of the heart from the recipient is tantamount to murder, and that doctors are not trustworthy that the transplant will work both because who knows whether the new heart will work any better than the old one, and because past recipients have lived only a short time. It would be interesting to see more recent literature on this topic as medical knowledge in this field has improved vastly over the past four decades. Readers are encouraged to send in references.

Mikveh in a bad neighborhood - Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 2:91

In a strange case brought to Rav Moshe Feinstein in 1964, the question was asked about the status of a mikveh in a non-Jewish neighborhood which apparently had windows that allowed passers-by to look into the mikveh. Rav Moshe begins by decrying this as a major breach of tzniut, and then notes that the טבילה that the women do may not be good, as they might be so self-conscious as to not be careful with what they are doing. He further exhorts the community to take whatever measures necessary to construct a mikveh that is not compromised.

Rav Moshe then addresses the issue of how the new mikveh is to be built. Apparently, the community wanted to destroy the existing mikveh in order to build the new one. However, Rav Moshe notes that this would leave the community without a functioning mikveh for the intervening period, and that would be an untenable situation.

An additional issue raised was whether or not the community should be worried that a non-Jew would climb up on the roof of the new mikveh and pour water into the pit that was collecting rain water for the mikveh, thus invalidating the mikveh. Rav Moshe ruled that we do not worry that a non-Jew would do something like this, which involves a certain degree of effort, if he stands to gain nothing.

Finally, the questioner asked as well about a community who wanted to construct a shul so that the Aron and bima could be automatically lowered out of sight in the event that a wedding would take place in the shul. Rav Moshe rules unequivocally that such a move would be forbidden, as it would not be respectful to the Torah for it to be below the floor while people are celebrating above (and not necessarily celebrating in a halachically acceptable fashion). Furthermore, Rav Moshe points out that the Chatam Sofer and others do not approve of using shuls as venues for weddings.

Dental stiches and mikveh - Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 2:87

With regard to whether or not stitches as a result of oral surgery present a problem of chatzitza for a woman who has to go to the mikveh, Rav Moshe rules that since the stitches cannot be seen and can only be manipulated via a fine instrument they are considered to be in a מקום בלוע and thus do not need to have the water reach them and thus are not considered to be a chatzitza.

Listening to Gentile music - Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 2:56

In this brief teshuva, Rav Moshe rules that it is forbidden to listen to non-Jewish religious music, even on the radio or a recording. This applies not only to current songs, but to ones from the past as well [ed. note - this can be an issue when taking music courses in college and Gregorian chants are part of the curriculum]. Even if the song uses psukim from Tehillim (or elsewhere in Tanach, e.g. The Hallelujah Chorus), it is forbidden. However, if the song is written and/or song by a non-Jew but has no religious purpose, then there is technically no prohibition.

Rav Moshe considers the case of Acheir, who the Gemara claims left Jewish religious life as a result of his constantly singing Greek songs. After some discussion as to whether this could really be the reason that he abandoned his religious life, Rav Moshe cites the Maharsha who says that he was singing songs that had connections to idolatry that led him to heresy. Rav Moshe also notes that a potential issue is the mentioning of the names of other gods, as that would violate the prohibition of ושם אלהים אחרים...לא ישמע על פיך.

[ed. - Does that last point present a problem from songs such as "Let it Be" or "Walking in Memphis"? Discuss.]

Getting remarried - how soon is too soon? - Igrot Moshe Even HaEzer 4:48-51

In this run of teshuvot from a variety of years spanning several decades, Rav Moshe Feinstein deals with issues pertaining to how soon a woman can get remarried. The issues are generally those surrounding children, both those unborn as well as those recently born.

In general, the rule is that a woman has to wait for three months after the end of her previous marriage before entering a new one so that if she becomes pregnant it will be clear who the father is. In this case, asked by Rabbi Ephraim Greenblatt of Memphis, TN, the woman had been separated from her husband for several years yet only now became officially divorced. Rav Moshe ruled that she nevertheless had to wait three months from the time of the actual divorce.

In the second teshuva, Rav Moshe's grandson-in-law Rabbi Shabtai Rappaport asked about a woman whose husband was killed in war (presumably in the Lebanon War, as the question was asked in late 1983). The woman had an infant from that husband (born after his death) and had stopped nursing the child for normal reasons. The woman now met a man and wanted to marry him. Despite the fact that in halacha 24 months are allotted for nursing, with the fear that if a woman becomes pregnant before that she will starve the baby, the fact is that since the baby had stopped nursing on its own (well before 24 months) and since the presence of a husband would provide a stable household for this woman and her children, Rav Moshe permitted her to get married without having to wait until the end of 24 months.

Rav Moshe takes a different approach when it comes to a divorcee. In a case posed to him by Rav Moshe Dovid Tendler, the woman was divorced with an infant, and wanted to remarry before the child turned 2 years old. Since the husband in this case was particularly difficult with regard to paying alimony, and the courts were fairly ineffective in forcing him to do so, Rav Moshe found it difficult to consider this child as being supported by his father (the presumption is that the new husband will not want to support the children of the old one - obviously that can vary from case to case). Rav Moshe ultimately permits her to remarry once the child is 18 months provided that she sees to it that the child is financially provided for and provided that she feels an overwhelming need to get married at that point in time.

In a teshuva written one year later to Rav Shalom Tendler, Rav Moshe addressed a case of a divorcee who had a very young infant and had stopped nursing already so that she could return to work (not far remarriage purposes) and now had met someone interested in marrying her. Rav Moshe permitted her to marry the man, provided that she saw to it that the child would be fully provided for until age 2. The fact that the man was considered to be a positive development for the child played a role in this decision as well.

Artificial Insemination - Rav Mordechai Ralbag - Techumin 24

In this article in Techumin volume 24, Rav Mordechai Ralbag (a חבר בית דין in Yerushalayim) discusses the issue of a single woman who is artificially inseminated (AI) and the status of the child. At the outset, he notes that he is not endorsing the practice, but rather is discussing what happens with the child assuming that a woman has proceeded with said procedure.

Rabbi Ralbag begins by assuming that the most common case of AI is with a married couple who is having fertility issues. He notes that although there is some discussion on the issue, most poskim allow the husband to make his semen available for such a procedure, without worrying about השחתת זרע לבטלה, as there is a clear purpose in this case. However, everyone agrees that so long as the woman is married there is no permission given for another man to donate his semen. There are various reasons given for this prohibition - ranging from an איסור דאורייתא to a range of concerns that will develop down the road to a visceral distaste - but the agreement on the basic law stands.

In terms of the status of the child in such a case, if the donor is not Jewish then the child is fine, as the law is that a non-Jewish man who impregnates a Jewish woman produces a child whose halachic status is clear. If the donor is a Jew, then there is a debate as to whether or not the child has the status of a ממזר.

When it comes to the case of a sperm bank, how are we to deal with the identification of the donor, assuming that the bank keeps such information private? Outside of Israel, we can assume that most donors are not Jewish, and thus certainly for a single girl there will be no problem, since Rav Moshe Feinstein and Rav Yaakov Breisch have already established that we can follow the majority. If the woman is married, then things are more complicated, since what happens if the donor was in fact a Jew? Rabbi Ralbag invokes the rules of כל דפריש מרובא פריש - that since the woman goes to the hospital to be impregnated, then the sperm is considered to be separated from its source, it which case we can assume that it was derived from the majority, which in the case of חוץ לארץ means that it came from a non-Jew.

Based on an argument about the difference between שתוקי and אסופי, Rabbi Ralbag posits three possible views for our case, where the identity of the mother is known but that of the father is not:

1) According to the Maharit, the child is considered a שתוקי since even the mother does not know the identity of the father, and thus the child is a ספק ממזר.

2) According to the Noda BiYehuda, the child is considered to be an אסופי who has a sign on him (namely that his mother is protecting him). Thus, there is no ספק on the mother, and the ספק on the child is lifted by the fact that the child is considered to be פריש and thus is כשר.

3) According to the Yeshuot Yaakov and the Beit Meir, it is possible that there is no problem at all, since, based on a Gemara in Sotah, we learn that זנות is only an issue when there is actual intercourse, which did not take place in the case of AI. As such, it could be that the child is complete כשר. On the other hand, it is possible that since we know that the single mother became pregnant without know who the father is that the child will be deemed a שתוקי.

Rabbi Ralbag brings his analysis to an end by citing the view of Rav Moshe Feinstein (cited earlier on this blog) that ממזרות can only be contracted via an actual act of intercourse, and since there is none in this case, the child will be fine even if the father is himself a ממזר.

In his conclusion, Rabbi Ralbag brings support from both Rav Shalom Messas (Rav of Yerushalayim) and Rav Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg, that his analysis is correct and that if a single woman does receive AI, even though it is not advised at the outset, nevertheless the child will be deemed כשר and acceptable to marry another Jew without question.

Maintaining a Minyan - Igrot Moshe Orach Chayim 3:16

In memory of my grandfather, Walter Rosenthal a"h, whose 9th yahrtzeit is this evening, the 16th of Tevet. He was described by his Rabbi at his funeral as a "shul Jew," always committed to ensuring that he did everything that he could for his out-of-town congregation.

Rav Moshe Feinstein was asked about a shul that was having trouble with its weekday minyan. Apparently, the time of the minyan was too early for some of the people who belonged to the shul, and they wanted to daven elsewhere. However, this put the daily minyan in jeopardy and thus the question was whether the minyan should be abandoned or whether people should be pushed to help make the minyan.

Rav Moshe ruled that since this shul had a permanent minyan, it was incumbent upon the members of the community to keep it going. Even if some of the people chose to daven instead in a nearby Beit Midrash, which may be a preferable location for davening (although perhaps only for people who spend their day learning there), there should at least be enough people who make sure that the shul in question is able to maintain their daily minyan, insofar as it was well-established and constant. However, Rav Moshe notes that the Beit Midrash should be assured of a minyan as well, and if the davening time of the shul is too early for people, then a rotation should be set up so that no one has to overextend themselves every day.

Tallit and Tefillin before sunrise - Igrot Moshe Orach Chayim 4:7

There is an earliest time when one can put on tallit and tefillin - generally between 40 minutes and an hour before sunrise, depending on which posek one follows. What does one do if he has to daven much earlier than sunrise to the extent where he has to put on his tallit and tefillin before he is obligated to do so? This question is quite pertinent right now, as sunrise in Bergen County (where this blog is written) is well after 7am, and thus minyanim that begin closer to 6am begin before most poskim feel there is an obligation for tallit and tefillin.

Rav Moshe Feinstein felt that such a situation is comparable to a case of a person who gets tallit and tefillin in the middle of davening. In that case, the individual should put them on and make the bracha after ישתבח but before קדיש. In this case, since one has the tallit and tefillin from the start but is simply not yet obligated to wear them and, by extension, should not make the bracha, the person is allowed to put them on right away, but should wait until after ישתבח then pause and make the bracha.

There are those who say that in this case one should move his tallit and tefillin around before making the bracha so as to create circumstances as if he is newly putting them on at that time. This would be done to fulfill the requirement of עובר לעשייתן - that brachot made on mitzvot have to be made before the mitzva is performed. Rav Moshe felt that such movement was not necessary for the purposes of the bracha, and that the עובר לעשייתן requirement was fulfilled with the continued performance of the mitzva after the bracha is made. However, he does encourage one to move around his tallit and tefillin when he makes the bracha as a recognition of the mitzva that he is now making a bracha on.

Taking off a Kippa - Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 3:2

In a teshuva from 1974, Rav Moshe was asked about whether it would be permitted for a person to remove his kippa in a business situation if keeping it on would cost him financially.

Rav Moshe replied that according to virtually all poskim wearing a kippa is a מידת חסידות, and even though it has been widely accepted by Jews it nevertheless takes a back seat in the face of potential financial loss, which qualifies as אונס. The one possible difficulty is the view of the Taz, who raises the possibility that not wearing a kippa would be considered חוקות הגוים. However, Rav Moshe rejects this view based on the fact that nowadays, a man walking around with a bare head is considered de rigeur from a fashion standpoint and is not done for any ritual purposes. As such, a Jew walking around with a bare head would not be considered to be conforming to any specifically non-Jewish practice, and when money is on the line he should remove his kippa rather than risk his income.

Kaddish before burial - Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 3:160.3

My grandmother passed away on the Friday of Thanksgiving weekend and was not buried until Sunday. Should kaddish have been said already over Shabbat, even though aveilut does not begin until burial?

This question was addressed by Rav Moshe Feinstein in a teshuva written in 1981. In the teshuva, Rav Moshe notes that this is subject to a debate between the Taz and the Shach, with the former ruling that kaddish should be said and the latter (in the Nekudat HaKesef) writing that there is no need to say kaddish. The Shach explains his reason by noting that ther purpose of kaddish is to help the soul of the deceased be saved from gehinom, and since that is not even a possibility until burial, there is thus no reason for kaddish to be said.

Rav Moshe supplies a reason for the Taz's viewpoint that kaddish should be said. While there is no issue of gehinom until burial, there is still the issue of the deceased being judged in the heavenly court, and kaddish can certainly serve as a merit in that judgement even before the body has been interred. Rav Moshe feels that even the Shach would see merit in this rationale.

While the Avodat HaGershuni comes out squarely against saying kaddish at all before burial, Rav Moshe notes that the Gesher HaChayim of Rav Yechiel Michel Tuketchinsky (the authoritative source for the laws of mourning) sides with the Taz, and Rav Moshe seems inclined to do so as well.

Chanukah Issues - Igrot Moshe Orach Chayim 4

In a quick paragraph at the end of teshuva #101 in this volume, Rav Moshe states that his preferred candle lighting time is 10 minutes after the beginning of sunset (what we would call 10 minutes after שקיעת החמה). He notes that if a person lights that such a time he will need sufficient oil to last for about an hour, as the candles have to remain lit until half an hour beyond dark.

In the final section of teshuva #105 in the same volume, Rav Moshe discusses whether or not a person should light candles in a place where there will be no פירסומי ניסא (publicizing of the miracle). He notes that publicizing the miracle to non-Jews only does not count, and thus what should a person do if he is alone somewhere. Even further, the halacha is that a person who is travelling and is unable to light can rely on his wife's lighting at home in order to fulfill his own obligation - what if the individual can rely on his wife but also has the capability of lighting?

Rav Moshe rules that in such a case an individual should light for himself, even if he will be the only person to see the candles. Even further, such an individual should light with a bracha, as the need to publicize the miracle, crucial as it is, does not hold up the performance of the mitzva. As such, someone who arrives home very late at night when his entire family is sleeping should nevertheless light with a bracha, as doing so will publicize the miracle at least for himself.

Difficult Chanukah Situations - Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 3:15.5

In this brief section of a multi-part teshuva, Rav Moshe Feinstein deals with cases of people whose main domicile is not easily discerned insofar as it concerns where they should light Chanukah candles.

In terms of students living in a Yeshiva dorm, Rav Moshe rules that they should light in their rooms, where they at least have some sense of ownership, and not in the main dining room or other common area of the Yeshiva. As leaving the candles alone would constitute a fire hazard, the students within any one room should have a lottery to decide who has to stay in the room with the candles each night.

In terms of someone who is camping and thus away from home or who is travelling through the night, Rav Moshe indicates that such a person is exempt from lighting candles.

If someone is going out for dinner, such as for a family get-together, but will return home later that night, Rav Moshe is concerned that people will see him return home and suspect that he did not light if he lights in his host's home. Thus, such a person should either light at home before he leaves or come home while people are still out and about and light and home after the party.

More on Artificial Insemination - Igrot Moshe Even HaEzer 1:71 and 4:32.5

In 1959, Rav Moshe Feinstein was asked about a married woman who was having trouble becoming pregnant from her husband and was considering artificial insemination. Apparently, there was a practice known as adding a "booster," which would be some semen from the husband added to that of the (anonymous) donor. According to Rav Moshe Dovid Tendler (Rav Feinstein's son-in-law and a physician as well as a Rav), the booster was merely a ruse to calm the husband and to make him feel that the child was at least in part his.

Several issues come out of this point. First, Rav Moshe writes that any artificial insemination should use a non-Jewish donor, as that will pre-empt any potential issues of the child one day marrying a relative, since he will not be halachically related to his unknown father's family. Second, if the woman is concerned that her husband's fertility issues (in this case taken to be low sperm count) will heal in the next few months, then she should not be intimate with her husband during the next three months so as to confirm that the child belongs to the donor.

Rav Moshe also notes that if the identity of the donor is not known at all then it can be assumed in America to be that of a non-Jew, since most of the population is non-Jewish and since the way in which the semen is obtained is against halacha and thus it is unlikely to be from a Jewish donor.

Rav Moshe rejects the view that being artificially inseminated is tantamount to promiscuity, but he does note that it should be done with the consent of the husband since if the woman does become pregnant that will place burdens on the husband both financially, emotionally, and will limit his ability to be intimate with his wife.

In the final paragraphs of the teshuva Rav Moshe discusses a situation where the husband's issue is more that his strength is such that he cannot impregnate his wife, although his semen can if it could be made to reach the ova. In such a case the question becomes whether it is permissible for the husband to become his wife's artificial donor. In addressing this, Rav Moshe discusses some of the methods by which the semen is obtained from the donor (I am not going to get specific, although the teshuva does), and he concludes that since the purpose of obtaining the semen is in order to impregnate his wife, it would not be considered הוצאת זרע לבטלה and therefore he could be דש מבפנים וזורה מבחוץ.

In the second teshuva, written in 1981, Rav Moshe defends his earlier teshuvot, noting that he does not recommend artificial insemination as it does not constitute a fulfillment of פרו ורבו and it is possible that it will cause the husband to become jealous. However, in the case where the plan is to use the husband's semen, either because regular intercourse is not succeeding but both husband and wife have been determined to be fertile, or because the woman's menstrual cycle is such that it is virtually impossible for them to ever have a halachically acceptable opportunity to conceive, then Rav Moshe stands by his view that such a plan could be carried out.

Artificial Insemination - Status of the Woman and the Child - Igrot Moshe Even HaEzer 1:10

Rav Moshe Feinstein was asked in 1961 about a woman whose doctor had artificially inseminated her insofar as she and her husband had been unsuccessful in having children and the suspicion was that it was a deficiency on his part, not hers. The question raised was whether the woman would be forbidden to her husband like an אשת איש שזינתה and what the status of the child would be.

In terms of the woman, Rav Moshe ruled that she would still be permitted to her husband, since a woman is only forbidden to her husband as the result of having illicit sexual relations, which did not occur in this case. The mere presence of another man's semen in her uterus is not, in Rav Moshe's view, sufficient cause to force her to separate from her husband.

In terms of the child, Rav Moshe is similarly lenient. He postulates that the child would only be a mamzer if there had been forbidden relations, but since there were not the child is thus כשר. As proof, he cites the case of Ben-Sira, who was allegedly conceived when his mother absorbed a man's semen by entering a bath after he had been in there - and yet Ben-Sira was considered to be ולד כשר. Even further, Rav Moshe rules that even if the doctor claimed that the semen was from a Jewish man he is not to be believed (this is assuming a non-Jewish doctor in America), since we assume that he only said that knowing that the woman was Jewish and that she would have preferred that the donor be Jewish. However, since most donors in America are not Jewish, we can rely on that רוב and the child would be permitted to marry anyone. If the child were to wind up being a girl, Rav Moshe is prepared to allow her to marry a kohen, demonstrating just how far he is willing to go with this line of thinking.

The only way in which Rav Moshe sees some deficiency in the lineage of the child is that he absolves the husband - who is not the father - from having to provide for this child or from having to pay for the delivery, although that latter ruling is due to the fact that he was not complicit in the decision to inseminate the woman.

(Note that unlike the teshuva posted from Rav Sherlo on this topic, in this case the woman was married and had not succeeded in conceiving. I am not sure what Rav Moshe would rule about a single woman who wanted a child without marrying - but stay tuned.)

Testing for Tay-Sachs - Igrot Moshe Even HaEzer 4:10

In 1973, Rabbi Moshe Tendler raised to his father-in-law the issue of testing for Tay-Sachs, a genetic disease found among Jews of Ashkenazic descent. The disease can only be contracted by a child whose parents were both carriers of the disease (even though it may not affect the parents at all), and the horrific impact is generally a very short life for the child. By the time of the question, reliable blood tests existed to help determine whether or not a person is a carrier for this disease, and Rav Moshe Feinstein was asked to rule on whether or not people should be tested before getting married.

Rav Moshe's initial response is to say that given the existence of such blood tests, avoiding having such a test would not only not be a lack of faith in God, but would actually be a case of closing one's eyes to something that he has the ability to know. Thus, Rav Moshe does encourage such blood tests to be taken by people who are contemplating marriage.

However, Rav Moshe does offer some caveats. First, he stresses that this should be a private process, to be revealed only when it is important with regard to a specific shidduch. Second, he notes that since people often get nervous about such issues and often make a bigger deal out of things than they should, therefore people should not be tested or even talked to about such testing until they are legitimately of an age when they may begin looking to get married.

Finally, it seems that there was a fund for Tay-Sachs research that included non-Jewish and non-religious doctors, which, among other things, encouraged the aborting of babies who were determined while in utero to have Tay-Sachs. Rav Moshe discouraged religious doctors from participating in this organization, but noted that if there were beneficial and halachically permissible aspects to this organization then they could join so long as they did not in any way lend their support to the aborting of babies.