Mitzvot Tzrichot Kavana - Minchat Shlomo O.C. 1

 In this teshuva, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach deals with the question of whether or not doing a mitzva without kavana invalidates the performance of that mitzva.  Specifically, he wonders whether someone who eats in a succah but lacks kavana for the mitzva is considered to have eaten outside of the succah, or if someone who wears tzitzit without having kavana for the mitzva is considered as if he failed to wait tzitzit on that garment.  Along the way, he raises further possible ramifications, such as whether one would violate the prohibition of kilayim if he wore wool tzitzit on a linen garment (which is normally permitted for the mitzva) without having kavana to fulfill the mitzva.  After analyzing the question through the perspective of other mitzvot, such as affixing a mezuza to one's door, slaughtering an animal, and putting a fence around one's roof, Rav Auerbach concludes that while one who wears tzitzit without having kavana for the mitzva does not fulfill the mitzva, he also does not violate a lo ta'aseh, where one who sits in a succah with having kavana for the mitzva may be in violation of something since there is the additional requirement of teishvu k'ein taduru.

In the second section of this teshuva, Rav Auerbach determines that if one loses kavana during a mitzva he can still fulfill the mitzva.  His main focus is on someone who is saying Shema or Shemoneh Esrei and his mind wanders.  While he wants to say that it does not count, based on the halacha that someone who is not sure which u'chtavtam he is up to can continue with Shema if he instinctively says l'ma'an yirbu (since we assume that that is where he was up to), he infers that it counts at least b'diavad.  However, if someone is listening to someone else make a bracha or say a tefilla, he can only fulfill his obligation if he listens to the entire thing.

Skipping parts of davening - Igrot Moshe Orach Chayim 4:91

Can a teacher skip parts of davening if he is running late in the morning? In this teshuva, Rav Moshe Feinstein says that in such a case, the teacher can most definitely skip פסוקי דזמרא. He offers two rationales for this. First, if he were to come late to class he would be taking away learning time from his students; second, coming late to class would constitute stealing from his employer, who is paying him to be at work at a certain time. Rav Moshe notes that if the issue is that the teacher has his own work to do he should not skip any part of davening.

Rav Moshe does note the option of saying הביננו, which is a severely shortened version of שמונה עשרה, but concludes that since it is so rarely, if ever, said these days it is unlikely that the teacher will know it and thus the time saving as a result is likely to be minimal.

Tefillin on a dead arm - Avnei Nezer OC 1

The Avnei Nezer was asked about a person whose left arm had lost feeling and whether that person should continue to put tefillin on that arm.  By comparison, a bird whose wing dries out is considered to be lacking that limb - would we say the same by a person, that the useless arm is considered to not even exist, or could the individual still put tefillin on given that the arm does physically exist?

The Avnei Nezer differentiates between birds and people on this point.  He notes that by a bird, the wings are the main part of the animal (based on עוף יעופף), and that such a blemish would be considered a particularly catastrophic blemish, thus invalidating the animal.  Such an injury by a human would not rise to this level.

Another consideration is whether putting tefillin on the right arm would be considered better than putting them on the damaged left arm.  The Avnei Nezer feels that since the left arm still exists, there is no reason to place the tefillin on the right (wrong) arm.

Pidyon HaBen when the father is not Jewish - Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 1:195

In 1954, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Burstein of Kansas City asked Rav Moshe Feinstein about what to do in terms of pidyon haben for a child of a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father [a pidyon is based on פטר רחם, the opening of the womb, and thus it is the mother that is the critical aprent in this regard. See Bechorot 46a for more on this]. Rabbi Burstein had recommended that the maternal grandfather perform the pidyon haben, and Rav Moshe was inclined to agree with this ruling, as the grandfather could step in via the rules of זכייה, especially since the non-Jewish father is halachically insignificant in this case. Additionally, since there was a concern that the child would not do a pidyon for himself once he grew older, it was deemed best to do the ceremony now with the grandfather in lieu of the father. Rav Moshe went so far as to side with those who felt that the grandfather could do the pidyon with a bracha, and that the child would not need to re-redeem himself once he came of age.

Rav Moshe noted that, if possible, it would be best if the money used in the pidyon could technically be given to the child for the express purpose of the pidyon, as this would allow them to fulfill the view of the Shach.

With regard to the recitation of the bracha of שהחינו, Rav Moshe felt that one could follow the view of the Chatam Sofer and recite the bracha in this case (against the position of the Tzlach).

Taking Maaser from funds recovered from Nazis - Tzitz Eliezer 6:27

In 1957, Rav Waldenberg was asked whether one has to take ma'aser from reparations made or recovered from Germany as a result of their seeking to restore what the Nazis had forcibly taken from the Jews during the Holocaust. The questioner, Dr. Pinchas Wolf, assumed that no ma'aser needed to be taken, since the money or possessions that we being returned were actually the property of the recipient all along.

Rav Waldenberg argued that, in fact, the opposite would be true. Given the nature of the Nazi regime and the brutality with which they treated the Jews, with regard to their taking property from the Jews they would have the status of armed bandits. When a person has his money or other possessions taken from him by such individuals or gangs he is assumed to have יאוש, to have despaired of ever seeing that money again. Thus, if the money is ever returned to him it is considered to be not a return of the lost money, but rather a new infusion of funds that are thus subject to the laws of ma'aser.

Rav Waldenberg concludes by citing the Sefer HaChassidim, who discusses the important of giving ma'aser, and among the cases when one must give ma'aser he includes someone who finds a stolen object. Recovered funds or possessions that were taken by the Nazis certainly fall under the category of stolen objects that have been found (and whose owners have despaired of ever getting them back), and thus one should give ma'aser from these recovered funds.

Yichud - Ba'alah Ba'Ir - Tzitz Eliezer 6:40.4-5

In these two subsections of his essay on yichud, Rav Waldenberg focuses on the heter of בעלה בעיר, that there is no prohibition of yichud for a woman so long as her husband is present in the city.

In subsection four, his main concern is to assert the fact that there is indeed no prohibition of yichud under such circumstances - not only is there no punishment, but there is actually nothing prohibited about a woman being alone with a man so long as her husband is local.

In the section subsection, Rav Waldenberg pushes the limits of this leniency. What if a husband is in the city, but the woman is alone with a man somewhere other than her own house? If the leniency is based on the fact that the woman fears that her husband might come home at any moment and therefore she will not do anything illicit with the other man, then it would seem that this fear is absent in such a case and perhaps the leniency does not apply! This is in fact the view of the Chochmat Adam (among others).

However, Rav Waldenberg retorts that when Rambam mentions the idea of בעלה בעיר, he does not say that she fears her husband's return, but simply that she has a fear (more reverence than dread) of her husband. As such, one could posit that the mere presence of her husband in the city will serve as a restraining force on the woman even if she is not at home and her husband is unaware of her precise location. This view is put forward by the Sefer Yedei Eliyahu.

However, that position is then attacked from two sides. The Kol Eliyahu takes the predictable approach, reverting to our earlier statement that as long as the husband does not know where the woman is, her fear of him will be diminished and thus there should be a prohibition of yichud. The Chida comes from the opposite direction and says that since the Gemara simply says that we are lenient when the husband is in the city, it is not up to us to make distinctions within the details and thus there should be no prohibition in such a case. However, the Sefer Nishmat Kol Chai (Rav Chaim Palagi) retorts that since this leniency in the Gemara is stated with a reason for the leniency, that opens up room for us to make distinctions when warranted.

The Nishmat Kol Chai cites a position of the Radbaz that a woman can be in a yichud situation outside of her home so long as her husband in the city if that other location is a place of employment. In fact, this logic is the basis of allowing women to work in situations where they may encounter situations of yichud. While this would seem to support the lenient position stated above, in fact Rav Palagi claims that it works the other way - the only reason that such an arrangement is allowed is because the husband is aware of where the woman is and may even have occasion to show up at her place of employment during the day. However, if she were to be in an undisclosed location with another man, he would rule that to be forbidden. Rav Palagi concludes by stating that everyone agrees that yichud outside of the home would be forbidden.

Rav Waldenberg takes issue with Rav Palagi on two counts. First, he notes that it is not universally agreed that there is a prohibition in this situation. Second, with regard to the distinction of the Radbaz, he notes that perhaps when a woman is in a yichud situation with the permission of her husband she is more likely to do something inappropriate, since she assumes that since her husband is aware of where she is and approves of it, that she therefore does not worry that he will ever make an appearance. Ultimately, Rav Waldenberg that this issue seems to be stuck in a debate among the Gedolei Acharonim.

However, Rav Waldenberg goes even further than the Chochmat Adam. The Chochmat Adam writes that if the husband gives his wife permission to speak in private with another man, it would be forbidden for them to close the door. Rav Waldenberg claims that in such a situation that would actually increase the chances that the husband would show up to check things out, and thus perhaps there is still no prohibition of yichud under the rubric of בעלה בעיר. He cites the Dovev Meisharim who rules similarly, at least when livelihood is at stake.

The end of the teshuva raises as a possible point of proof a case of whether or not there is yichud in a succah, specifically with regard to having a chupah be there. Ultimately, Rav Waldenberg discounts such a case as having any bearing on our case since a new bride may not yet have a fully established fear of her husband, and thus the concept of בעלה בעיר might not be in full effect.

Yichud - One woman with two men - Tzitz Eliezer 6:40.3

In this section of his multi-part teshuva on yichud issues, Rav Waldenberg discusses the problem of yichud of one woman with two men. According to the Gemara in Kiddushin which serves as the basis for this entire discussion, one woman is allowed to be secluded with two men, althogh the Gemara then qualifies this by stating that this applies only if the individuals are צנועים, modest people. However, if they are considered to be פרוצים, lax in the sexual morals and behavior, then even a larger group would be problematic.


Rav Waldenberg's teshuva revolves around the basic point of who is considered to be a פרוץ and who is considered to be a צנוע. The initial problem stems from a statement of Rav in the Gemara who formulates a ridiculously high standard of who is considered to be a צנוע (using another אמוראas an example - the stories of that אמורא are found earlier in Masechet Kiddushin). Rambam basically codifies this view and rules that by his time no one could live up to that standard and thus everyone is considered a פרוץ.

However, Rav Waldenberg points out that most Rishonim did not accept this position of Rambam. Notable are the view of the Meiri, who opposes Rambam on the ground that it would invalidate everyone, and the view of Rashba, who writes that that rather than assume that everyone is a פרוץ, we should assume that everyone is fine unless known to be otherwise (and the statement of Rav in the Gemara should be seen as outlining simply a מדת חסידות). Rav Waldernberg further points out that Rambam may not in fact actually adopt the stringent view, as his statements elsewhere within הלכות איסורי ביאה seem to moderate that position.

In terms of who is considered to be a פרוץ for these matter, Rav Waldenberg rules that it is someone who is known to have violated issues of עריות in the past.

Rav Waldenberg concludes the teshuva with a discussion of whether or not having a child or the wife of one of the men present is sufficient to remove the yichud nature of the situation. He begins by noting that either condition is sufficient nowadays, regardless of whether or not the people are considered to be צנועים or פרוצים, on the logic that the presence of a child or a wife would prevent anything untoward from taking place. He proceeds from there to discuss several other details and contours of this aspect of the halacha.