In this run of teshuvot from a variety of years spanning several decades, Rav Moshe Feinstein deals with issues pertaining to how soon a woman can get remarried. The issues are generally those surrounding children, both those unborn as well as those recently born.
In general, the rule is that a woman has to wait for three months after the end of her previous marriage before entering a new one so that if she becomes pregnant it will be clear who the father is. In this case, asked by Rabbi Ephraim Greenblatt of Memphis, TN, the woman had been separated from her husband for several years yet only now became officially divorced. Rav Moshe ruled that she nevertheless had to wait three months from the time of the actual divorce.
In the second teshuva, Rav Moshe's grandson-in-law Rabbi Shabtai Rappaport asked about a woman whose husband was killed in war (presumably in the Lebanon War, as the question was asked in late 1983). The woman had an infant from that husband (born after his death) and had stopped nursing the child for normal reasons. The woman now met a man and wanted to marry him. Despite the fact that in halacha 24 months are allotted for nursing, with the fear that if a woman becomes pregnant before that she will starve the baby, the fact is that since the baby had stopped nursing on its own (well before 24 months) and since the presence of a husband would provide a stable household for this woman and her children, Rav Moshe permitted her to get married without having to wait until the end of 24 months.
Rav Moshe takes a different approach when it comes to a divorcee. In a case posed to him by Rav Moshe Dovid Tendler, the woman was divorced with an infant, and wanted to remarry before the child turned 2 years old. Since the husband in this case was particularly difficult with regard to paying alimony, and the courts were fairly ineffective in forcing him to do so, Rav Moshe found it difficult to consider this child as being supported by his father (the presumption is that the new husband will not want to support the children of the old one - obviously that can vary from case to case). Rav Moshe ultimately permits her to remarry once the child is 18 months provided that she sees to it that the child is financially provided for and provided that she feels an overwhelming need to get married at that point in time.
In a teshuva written one year later to Rav Shalom Tendler, Rav Moshe addressed a case of a divorcee who had a very young infant and had stopped nursing already so that she could return to work (not far remarriage purposes) and now had met someone interested in marrying her. Rav Moshe permitted her to marry the man, provided that she saw to it that the child would be fully provided for until age 2. The fact that the man was considered to be a positive development for the child played a role in this decision as well.
Showing posts with label marriage. Show all posts
Showing posts with label marriage. Show all posts
Tuesday, January 4, 2011
Thursday, October 21, 2010
The Missing Wife - Igrot Moshe Even HaEzer 4:2
A man from Kovno who emigrated to America in 1939 had planned to send for his wife as soon as was feasible. In 1940 he sent a coded message to her to join him, and she replied via telegram that she was on her way. After that, he never heard from her nor saw her again. In 1962, Rav Moshe ruled that it is a fair assumption that she was murdered along with so many others in the Holocaust, and that since the only reason that he could not remarry is the cherem of Rabbeinu Gershom that forbids polygamy (which thus ranks below a Rabbinic prohibition), he could remarry.
However, Rav Moshe does add that if the woman would show up at some point that he should write her a get immediately and pay her her ketubah.
However, Rav Moshe does add that if the woman would show up at some point that he should write her a get immediately and pay her her ketubah.
The Princess Bride teshuva - Igrot Moshe Even HaEzer 4:1
In the movie "The Princess Bride," Wesley informs Buttercup that her marriage to Humperdink never happened since she never said "I do." Thus, there would be no problem marrying him (Wesley) since she was not actually married to another man.
A similar situation was presented to Rav Moshe Feinstein in 1977. A man had come to America from Russia and had been married before his emigration. However, it was common for weddings in Russia to be done without chuppah and kiddushin, and he had separated from his so-called-wife before he moved. Could he go ahead and marry another woman without having to worry about divorcing his previous wife?
Rav Moshe ruled that at a basic level he could marry another woman, since his original marriage was likely done without chuppah and kiddushin, and even for those who worry about civil marriage having some halachic import, even the civil marriage was merely an act of registering one's name with the local authorities (which could be undone by just as simple an act). Even further, it was common for people to be separated from their spouses by the government for one reason or another, usually for relocation purposes, and thus the entire enterprise of marriage was nearly meaningless.
However, while for marriage purposes for the man Rav Moshe had no major issues, he was concerned about the first wife resurfacing, claiming that their marriage was done with all proper halachic ceremonies, and being put into a possible situation of being an aguna. Thus, Rav Moshe suggested that the man draw up a get, or at least testify before witnesses that should the woman appear he will give her a get immediately without any complaints.
A similar situation was presented to Rav Moshe Feinstein in 1977. A man had come to America from Russia and had been married before his emigration. However, it was common for weddings in Russia to be done without chuppah and kiddushin, and he had separated from his so-called-wife before he moved. Could he go ahead and marry another woman without having to worry about divorcing his previous wife?
Rav Moshe ruled that at a basic level he could marry another woman, since his original marriage was likely done without chuppah and kiddushin, and even for those who worry about civil marriage having some halachic import, even the civil marriage was merely an act of registering one's name with the local authorities (which could be undone by just as simple an act). Even further, it was common for people to be separated from their spouses by the government for one reason or another, usually for relocation purposes, and thus the entire enterprise of marriage was nearly meaningless.
However, while for marriage purposes for the man Rav Moshe had no major issues, he was concerned about the first wife resurfacing, claiming that their marriage was done with all proper halachic ceremonies, and being put into a possible situation of being an aguna. Thus, Rav Moshe suggested that the man draw up a get, or at least testify before witnesses that should the woman appear he will give her a get immediately without any complaints.
Monday, October 18, 2010
When is a mamzer not a mamzer? - Igrot Moshe Even HaEzer 4:23.1-2
I have already written up the last section of this teshuva, where Rav Moshe Feinstein used the behavior and character traits of the suspected mamzer as a final proof that he was not, in fact, a mamzer. In this summary I will focus on the bulk of the teshuva, where Rav Moshe tackles the essential halachic issues.
The question dealt with a woman who was civilly divorced in 1956 but only received her get in 1959. Later that year she married another man, and a few months later she bore a son. Clearly this son was not conceived after the second marriage. The new husband claimed that the child was his, and that the child had been concieved before the woman received her get. If that claim would hold, the child would be the product of an affair with an eishet ish, and thus would be a mamzer. The issues at hand focus on the trustworthiness of both the husband and the mother with regard to whether or not they can proclaim that their son is a mamzer.
The weightiest issue dealt with in the teshuva is that of yakir, the idea that the Torah recognizes a father's "recognition" of his children for halachic purposes. While we normally believe a father to say that a certain child is his, Rav Moshe notes that that only applies when he has raised the child and we have no reason to think otherwise. However, in this case it is clear that the child was concieved before he married the mother, and thus he does not have the right to declare his son a mamzer under the rubric of yakir. Rav Moshe claims that he does not even qualify as an eid echad to make such a claim.
However, Rambam seems to take the opposite view on this, claiming that a person can assert that someone is his firstborn for inheritance purposes, even if that son did not grow up with that father. Rav Moshe investigates this position and ultimately concludes that Rambam has two different takes on the law - one in the laws of inheritance and one in the laws of yuchsin (lineage). For inheritance purposes, Rambam would allow someone to make a claim about a child that he did not raise, while for lineage purposes a person cannot make such a claim with any degree of accepted credibility.
Taking that into account, Rav Moshe rules that we do not believe the new husband that he and the woman conceived the child before the divorce. This ruling is based on a variety of reason. One, we have no evidence that this woman was ever involved in a licentious relationship especially since for the three years since her civil divorce there was no indication that she was ever involved in a sexual affair. Two, even if there were witnesses that they were in seclusion with one another before her get was given, the gemara in Ketubot rules that we do not proclaim that a person is forbidden based on the knowledge that they had had yichud with someone. Three, if the only testimony that they had an affair is based on what the man says, then he would be incriminating himself, and we do not accept self-incriminating testimony.
With regard to any claims by the woman, we have less of a reason to believe her, since yakir only applies by the father and not the mother. As such, there is no halachically acceptable testimony that would establish that the child was conceived before the get was given, and thus Rav Moshe rules that he is not to be considered a mamzer.
The question dealt with a woman who was civilly divorced in 1956 but only received her get in 1959. Later that year she married another man, and a few months later she bore a son. Clearly this son was not conceived after the second marriage. The new husband claimed that the child was his, and that the child had been concieved before the woman received her get. If that claim would hold, the child would be the product of an affair with an eishet ish, and thus would be a mamzer. The issues at hand focus on the trustworthiness of both the husband and the mother with regard to whether or not they can proclaim that their son is a mamzer.
The weightiest issue dealt with in the teshuva is that of yakir, the idea that the Torah recognizes a father's "recognition" of his children for halachic purposes. While we normally believe a father to say that a certain child is his, Rav Moshe notes that that only applies when he has raised the child and we have no reason to think otherwise. However, in this case it is clear that the child was concieved before he married the mother, and thus he does not have the right to declare his son a mamzer under the rubric of yakir. Rav Moshe claims that he does not even qualify as an eid echad to make such a claim.
However, Rambam seems to take the opposite view on this, claiming that a person can assert that someone is his firstborn for inheritance purposes, even if that son did not grow up with that father. Rav Moshe investigates this position and ultimately concludes that Rambam has two different takes on the law - one in the laws of inheritance and one in the laws of yuchsin (lineage). For inheritance purposes, Rambam would allow someone to make a claim about a child that he did not raise, while for lineage purposes a person cannot make such a claim with any degree of accepted credibility.
Taking that into account, Rav Moshe rules that we do not believe the new husband that he and the woman conceived the child before the divorce. This ruling is based on a variety of reason. One, we have no evidence that this woman was ever involved in a licentious relationship especially since for the three years since her civil divorce there was no indication that she was ever involved in a sexual affair. Two, even if there were witnesses that they were in seclusion with one another before her get was given, the gemara in Ketubot rules that we do not proclaim that a person is forbidden based on the knowledge that they had had yichud with someone. Three, if the only testimony that they had an affair is based on what the man says, then he would be incriminating himself, and we do not accept self-incriminating testimony.
With regard to any claims by the woman, we have less of a reason to believe her, since yakir only applies by the father and not the mother. As such, there is no halachically acceptable testimony that would establish that the child was conceived before the get was given, and thus Rav Moshe rules that he is not to be considered a mamzer.
Wednesday, August 4, 2010
More on Giyoret - Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 3:110
The case in this teshuva is of a non-Jewish woman who was married to a Jewish man for 17 years. She lived as a Jew and their adopted children were converted and raised as Jews. She had asked to be converted in the past and had been pushed aside by the previous Rabbis of her community. Now, the new Rabbi asked Rav Moshe Feinstein if he should convert her.
Rav Moshe answered that since all evidence pointed to her sincerity to convert, she should be allowed to do so. However, since her husband was not particularly observant, she would have to be told about הלכות נדה and Shabbat and accept to keep those areas of halacha.
With regard to her having to separate from her husband for three months after conversion (the normal waiting period for a remarriage, instituted to ensure that the woman is not pregnant from the previous husband - in the case of conversion the waiting period is to separate between halachically unacceptable and halachically acceptable conversion), the issue was raised that the woman had never conceived and was now over 40 years old and thus perhaps the waiting period could be waived. Rav Moshe rejected this waiver on the grounds that since the waiting period applied when there had been no previous sin, it would not make sense to waive it for a couple that had lived in sin (intermarriage) for 17 years (לא יהא חוטא נשכר).
Rav Moshe answered that since all evidence pointed to her sincerity to convert, she should be allowed to do so. However, since her husband was not particularly observant, she would have to be told about הלכות נדה and Shabbat and accept to keep those areas of halacha.
With regard to her having to separate from her husband for three months after conversion (the normal waiting period for a remarriage, instituted to ensure that the woman is not pregnant from the previous husband - in the case of conversion the waiting period is to separate between halachically unacceptable and halachically acceptable conversion), the issue was raised that the woman had never conceived and was now over 40 years old and thus perhaps the waiting period could be waived. Rav Moshe rejected this waiver on the grounds that since the waiting period applied when there had been no previous sin, it would not make sense to waive it for a couple that had lived in sin (intermarriage) for 17 years (לא יהא חוטא נשכר).
Sunday, August 1, 2010
Ketubah for Shtuki and Asufi - Igrot Moshe Yoreh De'ah 3:106.3
In this final section of the teshuva, Rav Moshe discusses how we write the name of a שתוקי or an אסופי into a כתובה. These two categories, listed in the first mishna of the final chapter of קידושין, refer to individuals whose parentage is unclear and therefore their acceptability to marry a Jew is questionable. A certain city apparently had the practice to write their names followed by בן אברהם אבינו, similar to what is done for a convert. Rav Moshe ruled that such a practice should be stopped, since it would call into question the כתובות of converts if all of those categories of people would be labeled the same way.
Rav Moshe also objects to writing the mother's name, since that will potentially lead to confusion whereby one might think that the individual is from a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father and will wind up allowing them to marry another Jew or even a Kohein.
Rav Moshe also objects to writing the mother's name, since that will potentially lead to confusion whereby one might think that the individual is from a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father and will wind up allowing them to marry another Jew or even a Kohein.
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