Mitzvot Tzrichot Kavana - Minchat Shlomo O.C. 1

 In this teshuva, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach deals with the question of whether or not doing a mitzva without kavana invalidates the performance of that mitzva.  Specifically, he wonders whether someone who eats in a succah but lacks kavana for the mitzva is considered to have eaten outside of the succah, or if someone who wears tzitzit without having kavana for the mitzva is considered as if he failed to wait tzitzit on that garment.  Along the way, he raises further possible ramifications, such as whether one would violate the prohibition of kilayim if he wore wool tzitzit on a linen garment (which is normally permitted for the mitzva) without having kavana to fulfill the mitzva.  After analyzing the question through the perspective of other mitzvot, such as affixing a mezuza to one's door, slaughtering an animal, and putting a fence around one's roof, Rav Auerbach concludes that while one who wears tzitzit without having kavana for the mitzva does not fulfill the mitzva, he also does not violate a lo ta'aseh, where one who sits in a succah with having kavana for the mitzva may be in violation of something since there is the additional requirement of teishvu k'ein taduru.

In the second section of this teshuva, Rav Auerbach determines that if one loses kavana during a mitzva he can still fulfill the mitzva.  His main focus is on someone who is saying Shema or Shemoneh Esrei and his mind wanders.  While he wants to say that it does not count, based on the halacha that someone who is not sure which u'chtavtam he is up to can continue with Shema if he instinctively says l'ma'an yirbu (since we assume that that is where he was up to), he infers that it counts at least b'diavad.  However, if someone is listening to someone else make a bracha or say a tefilla, he can only fulfill his obligation if he listens to the entire thing.

Skipping parts of davening - Igrot Moshe Orach Chayim 4:91

Can a teacher skip parts of davening if he is running late in the morning? In this teshuva, Rav Moshe Feinstein says that in such a case, the teacher can most definitely skip פסוקי דזמרא. He offers two rationales for this. First, if he were to come late to class he would be taking away learning time from his students; second, coming late to class would constitute stealing from his employer, who is paying him to be at work at a certain time. Rav Moshe notes that if the issue is that the teacher has his own work to do he should not skip any part of davening.

Rav Moshe does note the option of saying הביננו, which is a severely shortened version of שמונה עשרה, but concludes that since it is so rarely, if ever, said these days it is unlikely that the teacher will know it and thus the time saving as a result is likely to be minimal.

Tefillin on a dead arm - Avnei Nezer OC 1

The Avnei Nezer was asked about a person whose left arm had lost feeling and whether that person should continue to put tefillin on that arm.  By comparison, a bird whose wing dries out is considered to be lacking that limb - would we say the same by a person, that the useless arm is considered to not even exist, or could the individual still put tefillin on given that the arm does physically exist?

The Avnei Nezer differentiates between birds and people on this point.  He notes that by a bird, the wings are the main part of the animal (based on עוף יעופף), and that such a blemish would be considered a particularly catastrophic blemish, thus invalidating the animal.  Such an injury by a human would not rise to this level.

Another consideration is whether putting tefillin on the right arm would be considered better than putting them on the damaged left arm.  The Avnei Nezer feels that since the left arm still exists, there is no reason to place the tefillin on the right (wrong) arm.

Pidyon HaBen when the father is not Jewish - Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 1:195

In 1954, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Burstein of Kansas City asked Rav Moshe Feinstein about what to do in terms of pidyon haben for a child of a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father [a pidyon is based on פטר רחם, the opening of the womb, and thus it is the mother that is the critical aprent in this regard. See Bechorot 46a for more on this]. Rabbi Burstein had recommended that the maternal grandfather perform the pidyon haben, and Rav Moshe was inclined to agree with this ruling, as the grandfather could step in via the rules of זכייה, especially since the non-Jewish father is halachically insignificant in this case. Additionally, since there was a concern that the child would not do a pidyon for himself once he grew older, it was deemed best to do the ceremony now with the grandfather in lieu of the father. Rav Moshe went so far as to side with those who felt that the grandfather could do the pidyon with a bracha, and that the child would not need to re-redeem himself once he came of age.

Rav Moshe noted that, if possible, it would be best if the money used in the pidyon could technically be given to the child for the express purpose of the pidyon, as this would allow them to fulfill the view of the Shach.

With regard to the recitation of the bracha of שהחינו, Rav Moshe felt that one could follow the view of the Chatam Sofer and recite the bracha in this case (against the position of the Tzlach).

Taking Maaser from funds recovered from Nazis - Tzitz Eliezer 6:27

In 1957, Rav Waldenberg was asked whether one has to take ma'aser from reparations made or recovered from Germany as a result of their seeking to restore what the Nazis had forcibly taken from the Jews during the Holocaust. The questioner, Dr. Pinchas Wolf, assumed that no ma'aser needed to be taken, since the money or possessions that we being returned were actually the property of the recipient all along.

Rav Waldenberg argued that, in fact, the opposite would be true. Given the nature of the Nazi regime and the brutality with which they treated the Jews, with regard to their taking property from the Jews they would have the status of armed bandits. When a person has his money or other possessions taken from him by such individuals or gangs he is assumed to have יאוש, to have despaired of ever seeing that money again. Thus, if the money is ever returned to him it is considered to be not a return of the lost money, but rather a new infusion of funds that are thus subject to the laws of ma'aser.

Rav Waldenberg concludes by citing the Sefer HaChassidim, who discusses the important of giving ma'aser, and among the cases when one must give ma'aser he includes someone who finds a stolen object. Recovered funds or possessions that were taken by the Nazis certainly fall under the category of stolen objects that have been found (and whose owners have despaired of ever getting them back), and thus one should give ma'aser from these recovered funds.

Yichud - Ba'alah Ba'Ir - Tzitz Eliezer 6:40.4-5

In these two subsections of his essay on yichud, Rav Waldenberg focuses on the heter of בעלה בעיר, that there is no prohibition of yichud for a woman so long as her husband is present in the city.

In subsection four, his main concern is to assert the fact that there is indeed no prohibition of yichud under such circumstances - not only is there no punishment, but there is actually nothing prohibited about a woman being alone with a man so long as her husband is local.

In the section subsection, Rav Waldenberg pushes the limits of this leniency. What if a husband is in the city, but the woman is alone with a man somewhere other than her own house? If the leniency is based on the fact that the woman fears that her husband might come home at any moment and therefore she will not do anything illicit with the other man, then it would seem that this fear is absent in such a case and perhaps the leniency does not apply! This is in fact the view of the Chochmat Adam (among others).

However, Rav Waldenberg retorts that when Rambam mentions the idea of בעלה בעיר, he does not say that she fears her husband's return, but simply that she has a fear (more reverence than dread) of her husband. As such, one could posit that the mere presence of her husband in the city will serve as a restraining force on the woman even if she is not at home and her husband is unaware of her precise location. This view is put forward by the Sefer Yedei Eliyahu.

However, that position is then attacked from two sides. The Kol Eliyahu takes the predictable approach, reverting to our earlier statement that as long as the husband does not know where the woman is, her fear of him will be diminished and thus there should be a prohibition of yichud. The Chida comes from the opposite direction and says that since the Gemara simply says that we are lenient when the husband is in the city, it is not up to us to make distinctions within the details and thus there should be no prohibition in such a case. However, the Sefer Nishmat Kol Chai (Rav Chaim Palagi) retorts that since this leniency in the Gemara is stated with a reason for the leniency, that opens up room for us to make distinctions when warranted.

The Nishmat Kol Chai cites a position of the Radbaz that a woman can be in a yichud situation outside of her home so long as her husband in the city if that other location is a place of employment. In fact, this logic is the basis of allowing women to work in situations where they may encounter situations of yichud. While this would seem to support the lenient position stated above, in fact Rav Palagi claims that it works the other way - the only reason that such an arrangement is allowed is because the husband is aware of where the woman is and may even have occasion to show up at her place of employment during the day. However, if she were to be in an undisclosed location with another man, he would rule that to be forbidden. Rav Palagi concludes by stating that everyone agrees that yichud outside of the home would be forbidden.

Rav Waldenberg takes issue with Rav Palagi on two counts. First, he notes that it is not universally agreed that there is a prohibition in this situation. Second, with regard to the distinction of the Radbaz, he notes that perhaps when a woman is in a yichud situation with the permission of her husband she is more likely to do something inappropriate, since she assumes that since her husband is aware of where she is and approves of it, that she therefore does not worry that he will ever make an appearance. Ultimately, Rav Waldenberg that this issue seems to be stuck in a debate among the Gedolei Acharonim.

However, Rav Waldenberg goes even further than the Chochmat Adam. The Chochmat Adam writes that if the husband gives his wife permission to speak in private with another man, it would be forbidden for them to close the door. Rav Waldenberg claims that in such a situation that would actually increase the chances that the husband would show up to check things out, and thus perhaps there is still no prohibition of yichud under the rubric of בעלה בעיר. He cites the Dovev Meisharim who rules similarly, at least when livelihood is at stake.

The end of the teshuva raises as a possible point of proof a case of whether or not there is yichud in a succah, specifically with regard to having a chupah be there. Ultimately, Rav Waldenberg discounts such a case as having any bearing on our case since a new bride may not yet have a fully established fear of her husband, and thus the concept of בעלה בעיר might not be in full effect.

Yichud - One woman with two men - Tzitz Eliezer 6:40.3

In this section of his multi-part teshuva on yichud issues, Rav Waldenberg discusses the problem of yichud of one woman with two men. According to the Gemara in Kiddushin which serves as the basis for this entire discussion, one woman is allowed to be secluded with two men, althogh the Gemara then qualifies this by stating that this applies only if the individuals are צנועים, modest people. However, if they are considered to be פרוצים, lax in the sexual morals and behavior, then even a larger group would be problematic.


Rav Waldenberg's teshuva revolves around the basic point of who is considered to be a פרוץ and who is considered to be a צנוע. The initial problem stems from a statement of Rav in the Gemara who formulates a ridiculously high standard of who is considered to be a צנוע (using another אמוראas an example - the stories of that אמורא are found earlier in Masechet Kiddushin). Rambam basically codifies this view and rules that by his time no one could live up to that standard and thus everyone is considered a פרוץ.

However, Rav Waldenberg points out that most Rishonim did not accept this position of Rambam. Notable are the view of the Meiri, who opposes Rambam on the ground that it would invalidate everyone, and the view of Rashba, who writes that that rather than assume that everyone is a פרוץ, we should assume that everyone is fine unless known to be otherwise (and the statement of Rav in the Gemara should be seen as outlining simply a מדת חסידות). Rav Waldernberg further points out that Rambam may not in fact actually adopt the stringent view, as his statements elsewhere within הלכות איסורי ביאה seem to moderate that position.

In terms of who is considered to be a פרוץ for these matter, Rav Waldenberg rules that it is someone who is known to have violated issues of עריות in the past.

Rav Waldenberg concludes the teshuva with a discussion of whether or not having a child or the wife of one of the men present is sufficient to remove the yichud nature of the situation. He begins by noting that either condition is sufficient nowadays, regardless of whether or not the people are considered to be צנועים or פרוצים, on the logic that the presence of a child or a wife would prevent anything untoward from taking place. He proceeds from there to discuss several other details and contours of this aspect of the halacha.

Yichud with an Adopted Child - Tzitz Eliezer 6:40.21

In this subsection of a long essay on various yichud issues, Rav Eliezer Waldenberg deals with the question of whether or not there is a violation of yichud between a parent and their adopted child of the other gender. His initial reaction is to say that there should be a violation of yichud, even if the child does not know that he or she is adopted, since, at the end of the day, there is seclusion with a male and female who are not close biological relatives.

However, Rav Waldenberg then shifts gears and says that there are several angles by which such a situation can be permitted, particularly if the adoption took place before the child was old enough to be subject to a prohibtion of yichud. His first avenue for doing so is based on the Levush, who explains that the reason that a biological child can have yichud with a parent is because we are not worried about any sin occurring in such a situation. Similarly, rules Rav Waldenberg, in a case where the child has grown up relating to the adult as a parent, we assume that the feelings between them are those of a parent and child and that no untoward behavior will take place. He even extends this to allow them to hug and kiss as any other parent and child would.

On a related note, Rav Waldenberg borrows a logic from the case of a man with his menstruating wife. Even though she is classified as an ערוה, her husband can nevertheless be alone with her without a concern that they will have forbidden relations. The rationale given for this by the Chazon Ish is that they are used to each other (and thus presumably understand the boundaries and are capable of controlling themselves). So too in our case, says Rav Waldenberg, can we assume that the parent and adopted child are used to each other, specifically in the context of a parent-child relationship, and will not commit any illicit sexual act.

Rav Waldenberg then notes that the Yereim explains the permission to be secluded with one's menstruating wife as being a function of the rule that we do not make decrees on the community that people will not be able to uphold. Since it is not reasonable to expect spouses to live apart for 12 days each month, yichud with one's wife during her nidda period was not decreed. In our case as well, it would be well-nigh impossible for parents and children to have to find separate domiciles once the child reaches the relatively young age when yichud becomes an issue. Based on the Sefer Chikrei Lev, he notes that this would also be in violation of the spirit of דרכיה דרכי נועם- that the ways of the Torah are pleasant.

Rav Waldenberg concludes by adducing proofs from several stories of Sages who raised non-biological children from a young age and conducted themselves with them as they would with their own children. Finally, he notes that these leniencies are important in order to continue to encourage people to adopt those in need of it, rather than allow them to live unstable lives.

Yichud with an adopted child - Igrot Moshe Even HaEzer 4:64.2

As a rule, there is no prohibition of yichud (seclusion) with one's own children. However, what about an adopted child? Since the parents and children are not actually related by blood, is there is problem for a father and his adopted daughter to be alone together in a house? We will review Rav Moshe Feinstein's answer today, and follow soon with the more detailed analysis of the Tzitz Eliezer.

Rav Moshe begins by describing the general situation of adoption, noting that it is a wonderful thing for a couple to do to adopt an orphan, and that often times this is done because the couple themselves have been unsuccessful in having children and adoption gives them the opportunity to raise a Jewish child. He further notes that it is important to eventually let the children know that they are adopted so that they do not have problems later in life in terms of potentially marrying their biological relatives, and, as such, it is important to try to find out who their real parents are or were (assuming the child is Jewish from birth).

In terms of the yichud issue, Rav Moshe rules that it is not a problem. His primary prooftext is a Gemara in Sotah 43 that rules that an adopted daughter (or step-daughter) should not marry her step-siblings since even though they are not blood relations, it presents the appearance of siblings marrying one another. Based on this, Rav Moshe extrapolates that if the father would be careful to not have yichud with this daughter, it would "blow their cover" and make it clear that she was not actually related. As such, it must be that no prohibition of yichud is introduced in such a case.

Rav Moshe further notes that yichud is not a problem since the parent would not dare do anything untoward with the stepchild or adopted child, insofar as he or she fears his or her spouse finding out. As such, Rav Moshe cautions that if the parent of the same gender as the child passes away, then the remaining parent should try to avoid yichud situations going forward.

Raisinets and Tape Recorders - Igrot Moshe Orach Chaim 3:31

In a brief teshuva, Rav Moshe Feinstein tackles two unrelated issues. The first is the question of what bracha to make on chocolate covered raisins, insofar as both components are independently desirable and delicious. As such, Rav Moshe rules that one should make both a שהכל and a בורא פרי העץ. Since it is generally not possible to eat the raisin part independent of the chocolate, a person should have in mind not to include the raisin when he makes the bracha on the chocolate, or should make a בורא פרי העץ on some other fruit first.

The second issue dealt with is whether there is a problem of erasing Hashem's name when one erases a tape recoding that mentions the name. Since the name of Hashem is not actually written on the tape, there is no actual prohibition, but Rav Moshe cautions that others may think that we are taking a cavalier attitude towards God's name. However, if one can erase it in a more indirect manner [perhaps by taping over it?] then that would be preferable.

Medinat Yisrael and Kedushat HaAretz - HaRav Shlomo Yosef Zevin

In this article written in Hatzofeh in December/January 1947-8, a few months before the establishment of the State of Israel (and reprinted in Techumin volume 10 with new material added), Rav Zevin reviews the history of קדושת הארץ and possible ramifications of a renewal of significant Jewish settlement in the Land.

On one level, the Land has independent kedusha, as reflected in various statements in the Gemara and Midrashim about God's concern for the Land and how one who lives in Israel has a God, while one who lives outside of Israel is as if he has no God. This kedusha is eternal, and is not connected to where Jews are living at a given moment.

Rav Zevin then discusses the kedusha that accompanies Jewish settlement in the Land, and differentiates between the kedusha that came about at the time of Yehoshua's entry to the Land and that which devolved at the time of Ezra's leading the Jews back from the Babylonian exile. The kedusha from the time of Yehoshua was created via conquest and perhaps via the building of the Beit HaMikdash, and most commentaries hold that this kedusha was nullified when the first Beit HaMikdash was destroyed and the people were exiled.

By contrast, the Jews who returned to build the second Beit HaMikdash did not conquer the Land, but merely built up settlements, and thus the kedusha at that time was created via their seizing of the Land. However, there is a debate as to whether this kedusha was full-force, or whether it only created a d'Rabbanan-level obligation for מצוות התלויות בארץ such as giving תרומות ומעשרות. According to Rambam, the obligation was only d'Rabbanan, since we require ביאת כולכם - everyone coming to the Land in order to restore the full kedusha. As with the kedusha from the time of Yehoshua, there is a debate as to whether or not this second kedusha was nullfied when the Beit HaMikdash was destroyed.

Based on these considerations, Rav Zevin discusses several issues that may now become relevant as Jews were about to return after two thousand years to their Land:

1) The Negev - the southern part of Israel falls outside of the borders that were conquered by the Jews at the time of Yehoshua, but well within the area promised to the forefathers. As such, it is possible that while crops grown there may not be subject to an obligation to give תרומות ומעשרות דאורייתא, there may nevertheless be a fulfillment of מצות ישוב הארץ for one who lives there.

2) The overall kedusha of the Land - if those who returned from Babylon could put kedusha back into effect by settling the Land, is it possible that the same could happen with those who are now returning. And, if so, can they re-create the kedusha in a way that it could spread to regions that had not previously been settled?

3) If a majority of Jews return to the Land, will we reach a situation of ביאת כולכם that would make fulfilling the mitzvot of the Land into מצוות דאורייתא? This was debated by Rav Chaim Soloveitchik and his student Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer [interesting trivia - Rav Chaim's great granddaughter is Rabbanit Tova Lichtenstein and Rav Isser Zalman's granddaughter is Rabbanit Miriam Amital]. Rav Chaim held that ביאת כולכם was tied to a historical moment and could only happen during the days of Ezra, while Rav Isser Zalman felt that it could happen at any time. Beyond that debate, there is the question of whether ביאת כולכם means literally all Jews or if we could invoke the well-known dictum of רובו ככולו and only require a majority of world Jewry to move to Israel in order to have a higher level of kedusha kick in. Rav Zevin sides with the view that we can invoke רובו ככולו [ed. note - we are getting very close to this point right now].

4) The mitzva of settling the Land - Rav Zevin concludes by noting that according to Ramban, one of the 613 mitzvot is to settle the Land, which the Marcheshet rules includes living in the Land and acquiring land in Israel. As we now have our own State, we finally have, for the first time in two millenia, the opportunity to fulfill this mitzva in all of its aspects.

May we merit to see the continual flowering of the גאולה and may we do our part in helping Hashem to fulfill וקבצנו יחד מארבע כנפות הארץ.

Soldiers refusing orders - Rav Yaakov Ariel - Techumin 4

In this article written in 1983, Rav Ariel deals with the question of whether or not soldiers are allowed to refuse orders. Specifically, he grapples with the issue of refusing the order to clear out Yamit and to invade Beirut. He also discusses following an order to begin a siege on Shabbat, as well as doling out collective punishment to Arabs in Yehuda and Shomron. The common denominator of all of these cases is the presence of a religious, halachic, or national consideration that stood in opposition to the official military order.


Rav Ariel's first approach is to consider a military order in the context of being a גזירת המלך. Rambam, based on the Gemara in Sanhedrin says that one may disobey a military assignment if it contradicts a mitvza, since דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעין - we obviously listen to God over listening to any of His subjects if the two are in contradiction to one another. In this vein, he cites a teshuva of the Chacham Tzvi who compares listening to a royal decree to the mitzva of כבוד אב ואם, specifically with regard to the fact that in neither case may one violate another mitzva in order to obey or respect another human. However, there are Rishonim who qualify this. The Meiri in Moed Katan writes that one may set learning Torah in order to do a mitzva that cannot be done by someone else, such as respecting one's parents, and in Sanhedrin he writes that a royal edict cannot override the public study of Torah, but it can override study by an individual.


Rav Ariel then distinguishes between כבוד and מורא, between respecting one's parents and fearing them, noting that in the former case one can set aside a mitzva, but not in the latter. As such, when it comes to following a royal order, since we are only commanded to fear a king, we can ignore the order we are doing so in order to perform a mitzva. Extending this line of thinking to our cases, Rav Ariel rules that refusing orders for a subjective לשם שמים purpose would not constitute a rebellious act.

From there, Rav Ariel considers a view of the Netziv that refusing an order contains an element of פקוח נפש, to the possible extent that someone who refuses an order is considered to be a rodef insofar as he is potentially endangering others while he remains safe at home (based on the story in Bamidbar of Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven). However, Rav Ariel also considers the spiritual peril that is brought about by an order that demands that someone violate halacha. As such, he advises soldiers to determine whether an order is objectionable from a subjective or an objective perspective, and to take counsel with a posek if they are not capable of making such a determination. Furthermore, he concludes that if it is too close to call, then the danger posed by refusing an order outranks the danger of fulfilling an order that seems to violate a halachic position, and in such a case the soldier should fulfill the order given to him.

In the conclusion, Rav Ariel deals with the specific cases that were brought to him:

1) With regard to a siege in the Sinai that was to begin on Shabbat, apparently this particular order was not an emergency situation, and thus Rav Ariel felt that one could refuse such an order. However, he noted that in general one can violate Shabbat for a military mission under emergency conditions.

2) With regard to evacuating the Yamit settlement, Rav Ariel ruled that soldiers were obligated to follow orders, based on the reasoning that the governmental decision to give over Yamit may have been a mistake in judgement, but was not intended to harm the Jewish people or the State of Israel. (See the statement by Mori V'Rabi HaRav Aharon Lichtenstein on the disengagement from Gaza in 2005 for more on this issue.)

3) With regard to soldiers who did not want to go to Beirut, Rav Ariel ruled that they are required to go, as refusing an order in a wartime situation is a particularly egregious act. Since one cannot prove objectively that the war is wrong and any arguments on that issue are based on one's political worldview, there is little room to allow for someone to be a conscientious objector.

4) With regard to soldiers asked to adminsiter collective punishment to Arab residents of Yehuda and Shomron, Rav Ariel permitted them to refuse the order assuming that the order was objectively in error. He felt that most of the Arabs living there were not actively at war with Israel and thus we nee to consider the idea of maintaining דרכי שלום with our non-Jewish neighbors.

Soldiers volunteering for dangerous missions - Rav Shlomo Min HaHar - Techumin 22

In honor of Yom Hazikaron, which falls out today but is being observed on Monday, a teshuva from the author of דיני צבא ומלחמה, a major halachic work for Israeli soldiers.

Rav Min HaHar was asked if one can volunteer for a military operation that is potentially life-threatening, if the option is to allow others to volunteer while the observant soldier stays behind and engages in Torah learning. The questioner also worried that perhaps failure to volunteer would result in a חילול השם. Finally, he asked whether or not the extra experience should be a factor?

Rav Min HaHar responded that there is ample evidence from Tanach of individuals volunteering for military service (soldiers fighting with Devora and Barak, Yonatan ben Shaul, and others), and many of these individuals clearly could have been staying behind and learning instead. However, Rav Min HaHar does not think that potential חילול השם should be a factor in the decision.

In terms of considering the fact that being involved in this mission will give the soldier more experience, which will be valuable in the future, Rav Min HaHar does not consider that sufficient reason to volunteer for a mission that would involved חילול שבת (since we do not allow medical students should work on cadavers on Shabbat based on similar logic), however it may be reason enough to allow someone to volunteer for a potentially dangerous mission.

Pesach in the Ghetto - Mima'amakim 1:17

Rav Oshry was asked two questions before Pesach concerning coping with the lack of food while at the same time trying to keep the various eating restrictions that come with the holiday.

The first question was whether people would be allowed to eat kitniyot if they became available, despite the general custom not to eat them. Rav Oshry ruled, based on the Chatam Sofer, that in a שעת הדחק one would be allowed to consume kitniyot, provided that he washed them to ensure that there was no grain mixed in with them.

The second question was more complex. Some of the Jews who worked in the forced labor camps had found potato skins and wanted to mix them with some flour in order to produce matzah. Since fruit juices mixed with flour do not produce chametz, this theoretically could have worked. However, since the skins were dirty they wanted to first clean them, and they were concerned that by introducing water into the mix that would actually reverse the situation, whereby the water and flour would mix and the juices of the potato skins would serve to speed up the fermentation process and thus the mix would definitely become chametz. Rav Oshry advised, based on the ruling of Rav Avraham Dovbear Kahana Shapiro, that they wipe the skins clean with a cloth and then bake matzot from them, thus avoiding the introduction of water.

מי כעמך ישראל גוי אחד בארץ

לז"נ קדושי עמך ישראל שמסרו נפשם על קדושם השם

Watching Christian Ceremonies on TV - Rav Soloveitchik

In Nefesh HaRav, Rav Herschel Schechter reports that when Kennedy was assassinated, his funeral was held in a Catholic church (St. Matthew's in Washington, D.C.) and many people, including many Jews, watched the service on television. Rav Soloveitchik was quite upset about this, as according to Catholic doctrine, those who participate in religious rites such as this via television "fulfill their obligation" of being a part of the service and thus all of the Jews who watched the service could be considered as having taken part in this non-Jewish religious service. Rav Soloveitchik concluded that there was no difference between entering the church in person and "entering it" by bringing it into one's home.

[Hat tip to Rabbi Daniel Feldman for reminding me of this source.]

Kitniyot Oil on Pesach - B'Mareh HaBazak 3

A questioner in Montevideo, Uruguay asked when it would be permissible to make use of kitniyot oils on Pesach, assuming that the kitniyot themselves are not present in their natural form in the oil?

The response from Kollel Eretz Chemdah was that while Ramo forbids kitniyot oil on Pesach, it is possible to permit such oils if the kitniyot did not come into contact with water during the processing. Even if water was involved, there would be room to be permissive if the kitniyot themselves were separated out (and thus alleviating the fear that grains that could become chametz were mixed in). This is based on the logic that we are allowed to eat wheat and other grains on Pesach so long as we make sure that they do not become chametz, and thus we certainly should be no stricter with kitniyot - as long as we can ensure that they have no concern of chametz there should be room to be permissive (Rav Kook used this exact logic in permitting sesame oil that was carefully prepared). Finally, they note that there is even more room to be permissive with soy oil. (Click on the "kitniyot" tab on the side to see other teshuvot on this topic.)

Inviting Non-Jews to the Seder - B'Mareh HaBazak 3

The community in Trieste, Italy asked Kollel Eretz Chemdah about a particular issue with their community seder. They realized that a noticeable number of attendees were intermarried, and the question arose as to whether the non-Jewish spouses could be served food at such a seder, since the Shulchan Aruch rules that other than servants, non-Jews may not be invited to non-Shabbat meals on Yom Tov since one might prepare extra food for them and the allowance for cooking on Yom Tov is only to cook for Jews for that day.

The teshuva begins by noting that inviting the non-Jewish spouses could be seen as given a seal of approval to the intermarriage, and such considerations should be kept in mind.

In terms of the issue at hand, there are several ways in which a non-Jew could be allowed to partake of a meal with a Jew on Yom Tov:

1)If the Jew who was cooking did not take the non-Jew into consideration or did not know that he was coming at the time of the cooking.

2) If the cooks in the kitchen are non-Jews and the Jew in the kitchen is simply overseeing the cooking so as to avoid a problem of בישול עכו"ם.

3)If the food is prepared in advance and is merely being warmed up on Yom Tov, and thus no cooking is taking place.

Beyond those issues, the non-Jews at the seder are allowed to be served and can be treated as any other guests once they are there, although they should not be given the matzah that is used for the mitzvah, out of respect for the mitzvah.

Shortening the Seder - B'Mareh HaBazak 3

The community in Quito, Ecuador asked the Rabbis of Kollel Eretz Chemdah if they were allowed to shorten any part of the seder for the benefit of members of their community who were not familiar with Hebrew (the seder in question was to be a communal one).

The response was that the first thing to be shortened should be parts of נרצה (such as only singing the final summary paragraphs of אחד מי יודע and חד גדיא). In terms of מגיד, the advice was not to remove anything, although various parts could be recited in the local language in order to increase their interest. However, any brachot or parts of Hallel should remain in Hebrew, and any particular noteworthy segments of the seder [ed. - perhaps מה נשתנה] should be left in Hebrew so as to preserve the traditional flavor of the seder.

In terms of translating parts of the seder, in a footnote the repondents discuss three reasons why we are generally opposed to reciting davening in translation and why those reasons do not apply when it comes to the seder:

1) It is often difficult to translate davening in a way that accurately preserves the true meaning and intention of the prayer. However, by the seder we are not as concerned with the specific words as we are with telling the story. As such, discussing the story in a familiar language could actually be an improvement over reciting the written text.

2) The are various סגולות connected to the words of davening - again, this does not apply to מגיד, which is composed of various statements of חז"ל which were not originally written for the purpose of being combined into the seder.

3) The resistance to davening in a language other than Hebrew is partially rooted in a fear of emboldening reformist elements. When it comes to the seder, that fear is not so salient, as people have always read or discussed the Haggada in their own language.

Using Church Candles - Chatam Sofer Orach Chaim 42

I came across this teshuva while preparing my weekly shiur on Ramban - it is based in part on a Ramban from parashat Vayakhel.

The Chatam Sofer was asked whether one is allowed to use candles from a house of idolatry (which I am going to assume is referring to a church), and whether they could be used in a shul. He split the question between candles that belonged to the church but had not been used, and those that had been used, then extinguished.

In terms of candles that were merely owned by the church, the Chatam Sofer ruled that they could definitely be used in a shul, since the mere designation of the candles as church candles was not sufficient to make it forbidden. Furthermore, since it would only be used for decorative purposes, and since the selling of the candles by the church would constitute a nullification of their idolatrous nature, they certainly could be used in shul.

However, would it be permissible to take a half-used church candle, melt it down, and then reconstitute it and use it in a shul? The Chatam Sofer begins by noting that according to the Shulchan Aruch one should not take the clothes of a priest and turn them into a tallit, as that small amount of tailoring would constitute a sufficient shinui to allow the sacramental clothing to be used for a mitzva. However, he feels that the melting down of a candle and subsequent re-rendering of it as a new candle would be a sufficient shinui and such a thing would be allowed.

However, he wonders if the Ramban in parashat Vayakhel militates against this. In discussing the kiyor (laver), the Midrash states that Moshe did not want to accept the women's mirrors to be used in its construction, since they were used for vanity purposes and thus had no place in the Mishkan. However, Hashem noted that they were in fact tools of shalom bayit and thus should be accepted (see Rashi on Shemot 38:8 for further detail). Ramban wonders why this was such a problem - after all, Moshe had no problem in accepting other jewelry from the women, but notable the kumaz, which according to the Midrash was an accessory worn on a woman's genitals! Why was Moshe not repulsed by accepting such an object!?

According to Ramban, since the kumaz was given along with many other types of jewelry, it was batel (nullified) in the mixture with the other accessories. The Chatam Sofer notes that the more logical explanation would be to say that since the jewelry was all melted down, the kumaz was not a problem, whereas the mirrors, which were not melted down, remained troublesome to Moshe. However, Ramban does not take that approach, and the Chatam Sofer reasons that according to Ramban, merely melting down something does not eradicate its repulsive nature. Applied to our question, that would mean that melting down the candles would not eliminate their stigma of having come from a church.

However, the Chatam Sofer disagrees with this approach (and a Gemara in Avoda Zara 52b which seems to make a similar point), and he permits using such candles under such circumstances. However, he notes that one who wants to be strict and not use such candles will be blessed from steering clear of objects that once were a part of foreign worship.

Heart Transplants continued - Tzitz Eliezer 5:25.6

In this teshuva that is the next subsection of the compendium that included the previous teshuva on heart transplants, Rav Waldenberg considers the case of assisting in the death of someone who is a goseis (is close to death) and would be better served by being put out of his misery, and perhaps is even requesting to be put out of his misery.

On a simple level, Rav Waldenberg rules that we may not do so, based on the Gemara in Shabbat mentioned in the previous teshuva and as codified by the Aruch HaShulchan, with the logic that we are not masters of our own bodies, and therefore none of us have the right to request the death of another, or even of ourselves.

Rav Waldenberg cites two cases that prove this. The first is the death of Rabi Chanina ben Teradyon, who was burned alive by the Romans while wrapped in a Torah, and with wet wool put over his heart to slow his death. Rather than let his students remove the wool to hasten the death, Rabi Chanina had the Roman officer remove it, since his students were not allowed to do anything to speed up his death, even though doing so would shorten his agony. The second case brought is that of David HaMelech killing the Amaleki who had killed Shaul HaMelech. Even though Shaul had requested that the Amaleki kill him so as to bring his death about quickly, nevertheless David held the Amaleki (who according to several commentaries was actually Jewish – see Shmuel Bet 1) liable for the murder.

Furthermore, based on a Gemara in Sotah we learn that prolonging someone’s life is considered to be meritorious, even if that life is a difficult and painful one. As such, no one has the right to take his own life or allow someone to do so in order to put himself out of his misery.